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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to develop, using a systems engineering 
approach, the functional analysis, general requirements, key performance 
parameters, and high-level architectural tradeoff considerations that lead to an 
architecture synthesis for an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) capable of 
shipwreck interior exploration. A design reference mission is used as the basis 
for the development of a high-level analysis of alternatives, mission planning, 
high-level essential tasks and constraints analysis. An examination of the 
problem space leads to the development of effective stakeholder needs and 
scope, including context, definitions, the identification of key concerns and 
system objectives. A literature review of the most mission-pertinent AUVs, 
including DEPTHX, HAUV, ARROWS and ACQUAS, reveals five key capability 
gaps. A functional analysis, requirements generation, and architectural design 
tradeoff analysis lead to the development of a potential architectural solution—
the wreck interior exploration vehicle (WIEVLE)—and eight recommendations for 
future architecture development. 
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The objective of this thesis is to develop, using a systems engineering 
approach, the functional analysis, general requirements, key performance 
parameters, and high-level architectural tradeoff considerations that lead to an 
architecture synthesis for an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) capable of 
shipwreck interior exploration. A design reference mission, featuring the interior 
exploration of the Komsomolets, a Soviet nuclear submarine wreck, for the 
purpose of intelligence reconnaissance, is offered early in the work, establishing 
the framework for a challenging and interesting mission.  
Today, shipwreck interior exploration is important for many reasons other 
than the simple thrill of traveling to an extreme environment. The capability to 
explore shipwreck interiors is potentially beneficial to a number of organizations 
including the Department of Defense, the archaeological community, the 
commercial salvage industry, and agencies concerned with the exploration of 
marine environments, such as Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. The 
following list provides specific examples of the benefit of wreck interior 
exploration for each of these types of organizations: 
• The Department of Defense may be interested in the collection of 
intelligence from foreign wrecks, the location and salvage of certain 
objects within wrecks, conducting rescue operations for survivors 
within new wrecks and conducting hull inspections internally for 
usability determination or forensic examination.  
• Archaeologists may be interested in the capability to systematically 
explore, map, and recover artifacts from wreck interiors. Artifacts 
recovered from inside wrecks are sometimes the only way to 
identify the wreck.  
• The commercial salvage industry may be interested in the 
identification of wrecks as well as the location and recovery of 
objects within wrecks. 
• Exploration organizations may be interested in the development of 
the technologies and processes necessary for wreck interior 
exploration.  
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Despite the potential for this capability, very few options exist for granting 
the explorer or salvager access to these remote places. One new and rapidly 
developing technological field, however, offers promise. Unmanned undersea 
vehicles may be the key to unlocking the mysteries of these unreachable places. 
In Chapter I, the exploration of shipwreck interiors by an AUV is presented 
as a challenging and important potential mission for a number of key 
stakeholders, including the Department of the Navy. The absence of an existing 
solution for this mission is described. A brief synopsis of the history of shipwreck 
exploration, the specific importance of shipwreck interior exploration, a 
background on unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and a discussion of 
AUVs set the stage for an enhanced understanding of the design reference 
mission (DRM) of Chapter II.  
In Chapter II, the DRM describes the Soviet nuclear submarine 
Komsomolets, the background of her sinking, important characteristics of her 
construction and the environment in which she rests. A hypothetical reference 
mission is offered, detailing a specific objective and describing potential 
intelligence collection targets. Following the DRM, four high-level alternatives are 
discussed in detail. The benefits and drawbacks of traditional human shipwreck 
penetration, human shipwreck penetration using atmospheric suits, remotely 
operated vehicle (ROV) shipwreck penetration, and the covert raising of the 
submarine itself are all established. Following this, the decision to proceed with 
an AUV system solution to the mission is justified and the preliminary mission 
planning starts. After laying out the key assumptions, the following high-level 
essential tasks for the mission are established: 
1. The submarine will launch the vehicle from depth to preserve the 
operation’s secrecy.  
2. The vehicle will navigate to the hull opening, stabilize, and enter the 
wreck.  
3. As the vehicle enters the wreck, it will record the environment using 
appropriate sensors.  
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4. The vehicle will systematically record its position as it additively 
builds the interior map of the submarine.  
5. The vehicle will propel itself in a manner that causes minimal 
environmental disturbance. 
6. When an internal space (compartment) has been mapped, the 
vehicle will maneuver to the next search area and continue the 
exploration. 
7. When the vehicle encounters an obstacle, it will determine the 
appropriate action to defeat that obstacle, execute the task, and 
continue or abort the search as necessary. 
8. The vehicle will recognize a target of opportunity and collect, or 
mark that opportunity for future collection, on the map. If operating 
on a tether, the vehicle may be commanded to manipulate or 
collect objects, or return to the crew for any reason.  
9. If operating untethered, the vehicle will monitor its health and 
remaining power and return to the crew if unable to continue its 
mission, upon reaching a minimum power threshold, or upon 
completion of the mission. 
The resulting nine tasks become the bedrock for the remaining research 
effort. The principal constraints are discussed, outlining first the expected 
operating conditions during the submarine loading and transport phase, the 
submarine launch phase, the target exploration phase, and the recovery phase. 
Logistic considerations and time constraints are followed by an assessment of 
expected environmental threats to the mission and the vehicle itself. These 
include entanglement, silt-out, strong and unpredictable currents, abrasion 
puncture and shock damage, temperature and pressure variations, toxic 
substances, corrosion, failure to collect the required data, and the loss of mission 
secrecy due to signature at the target site.  
In Chapter III, the problem space is developed, beginning with the 
potential stakeholder’s effective needs. The resulting needs analysis begins by 
identifying the stakeholders and carefully considering the value each could 
receive from an AUV solution to the problem. The needs are refined into effective 
needs statements for each stakeholder. The chapter concludes with the 
development of the scope of the mission. The purpose of the effort, division of 
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future life cycle responsibilities among systems engineering, program 
management, and Defense Department personnel, and operational context—
culminating in the creation of an operational concept graphic, context diagram 
and definitions, follows. Within the discussion of project scope, the relevant 
concerns and objectives are developed. The identification of principal concerns 
begins with a list of the characteristics of a perfect vehicle and a discussion of the 
key concerns of an actual AUV solution. The system objectives are then 
discussed, with a mention of the system capabilities outside the scope of the 
effort of this thesis.  
The literature review, contained in the second half of Chapter III, provides 
detailed discussion of the architecture of some of the most relevant existing AUV 
systems. The vehicle descriptions and methodologies for DEPTHX, HAUV, 
ARROWS (including U-CAT) and ACQUAS provide the answer to the critical 
research question: What are the characteristics of the architecture and 
methodology employed by existing AUVs for the exploration and mapping of 
other unexplored three-dimensional environments? Following this analysis, the 
advantages and disadvantages, with respect to wreck interior exploration, of 
each vehicle’s architecture are generated in four tables. Five primary gaps are 
identified as follows:  
1) vehicle size, shape and weight,  
2) vehicle propulsion and control capability,  
3) vehicle localization and mapping capability,  
4) vehicle data collection, storage and processing capability, and  
5) vehicle autonomous decision-making capability. 
Chapter IV entails the general functional analysis and requirements 
generation. The resulting functional decomposition results in 11 primary 
functions, with sub-functions up to two levels down decomposed from these. In 
keeping with standard systems engineering discipline, the functions are then 
mapped back to the effective needs. A requirements analysis follows, resulting in 
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the generation of 38 general requirements, which are then mapped to the high-
level essential tasks. Non-functional requirements are then explored, examining 
the system attributes of modularity, autonomy, vulnerability, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, testability, adaptability, affordability, compatibility, interoperability, 
modifiability, portability, recoverability, reusability, and usability. This results in 
the generation of 39 non-functional requirements. All requirements are then 
mapped back to the original stakeholder needs, and seven key performance 
parameters are established. 
1. The vehicle shall be sufficiently small to transit the target submarine 
(TS) interior, sufficiently smooth to resist snagging on debris, and 
sufficiently lightweight to be portable by two men. 
2. The vehicle shall be capable of autonomous propulsion, with 
sufficient agility and smoothness for complete environmental 
sensor coverage throughout the TS interior, without creating 
unacceptable silt-out conditions and while maintaining continuous 
awareness of the return route. 
3. The vehicle shall continuously map and record the TS interior with 
sufficient visual resolution and mapping precision to ensure useful 
intelligence collection. 
4. The vehicle shall be capable of sufficient processing capacity or 
tether-management to permit a complete mapping of the TS 
interior. 
5. The vehicle shall be capable of deciding, autonomously, when and 
how to defeat an obstacle, collect a target of opportunity, or return 
to the host submarine (HS). 
6. The system shall be interoperable with the host sub in all mission 
phases. 
7. The system shall be capable of preserving the secrecy of the 
mission.  
Chapter V harvests the effort sown in the first four chapters by 
synthesizing one possible architectural solution to the DRM. The chapter begins 
with an examination of five key architectural tradeoff considerations. After 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of tethered and untethered 
vehicles, vehicle size, vehicle shape, propulsion method, and the use of light 
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detection and ranging (LIDAR) and sonar, a wreck interior exploration vehicle 
(WIEVLE) architecture is developed, as shown in Figure 1. The physical 
architecture elements are described first, followed by the functional architecture 
elements. The architectural elements are then mapped to the general functional 
requirements of Chapter IV. The chapter concludes with recommendations for 
possible future versions of the vehicle. Based on the analysis of existing systems 
and the problem space, the author recommends that future architectures include 
the following characteristics: 
• small outer dimensions (approximately the size of a basketball)  
• smooth, preferably round, solid outer surfaces with flush-mounted 
sensors 
• minimum weight 
• tunnel thrusters, or guarded propellers 
• maximum sensor freedom of motion and field of view 
• minimal required maneuvering for sensor positioning 
• robust, reliable and precise mapping and localization capability 
• robust and conservative autonomous decision making capability 
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This chapter seeks to build the foundation of this thesis by providing the 
reader with a brief background to the history of shipwreck exploration, the 
importance of shipwreck interior exploration, and the context of the work—to 
include the objective, research questions, and contribution of the study. The 
chapter closes with the scope, limitations, assumptions, and methodology 
employed.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The exploration of shipwrecks has captivated the adventurous for 
centuries. Technological constraints have limited the exploration of ships lost to 
the deep until recently in human history. The following sections provide insight 
into the historical struggle to unlock the mysteries within shipwrecks and the 
direction of current technological efforts. 
1. A Brief History of Shipwreck Exploration 
What began as free-diving (diving without the use of air-supply equipment) 
for goods lost in relatively shallow wrecks transformed over centuries into 
increasingly sophisticated diving operations. Around 460 BC, Herodotus 
described a Greek diver named Scyllis who salvaged sunken treasure for the 
Persian King Xerxes (Acott 1999). Large, heavy diving bells later began to 
enable divers to breathe for limited periods at deeper depths, thus allowing them 
to accomplish more salvage work. Around 384–322 BC, Aristotle recorded the 
use of a diving bell by Alexander the Great (Acott 1999). Little advancement 
occurred during the next 2,000 years. Acott (1999) states that in 1616, Kessler’s 
diving bell allowed divers to walk on the seabed. Using a diving bell, Treileben 
and Peckell salvaged 42 cannons in 1640 from the Vasa, a Swedish ship, which 
sank to 132 ft. Acott further states that in 1825, James developed what was likely 
the first self-contained dive suit. In 1829, Dean conducted salvage work on the 
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Carn Brae Castle—the first known use of suited divers for salvage work (Acott 
1999).  
Mysterious illnesses had been occurring for some time with salvage divers 
working in bells and suits. Divers who worked for too long at depth would often 
return to the surface to experience crippling pain in their joints, causing them to 
bend their hands, arms and legs—leading to the name “the bends” for the 
mysterious illness. The first use of this term occurred during the construction of 
the Brooklyn Bridge circa 1873, where divers worked at length at depths of 
approximately 78 ft. (Acott 1999). Acott (1999) states that in 1915, the U.S. Navy 
published its Diving Tables, which suggested a maximum depth of 300 ft. for 
dives. These tables were used in the salvage of the F4 submarine, at a depth of 
306 ft., in 1916. Peress developed an atmospheric (or one-atmosphere) diving 
suit, known as the Tritonia, in 1930 and demonstrated its use at Byfleet, England, 
and at Loch Ness. In 1935, James Jarret dove on the Lusitania using the 
Tritonia, at a depth of 304 ft. (Acott 1999). In 1939, Momsen and Wheland 
published operational heliox decompression schedules. Using this mixture of 
oxygen and helium, 36 men were rescued from the USS Squalus, a submarine 
that sank to a depth of 240 ft. (Acott 1999).  
The mystery and danger of the deep continued to lure explorers from 
around the world. Diving technology had not yet advanced sufficiently to allow 
explorers access to the interiors of wrecks. Then, in 1943, Jacques-Yves 
Cousteau and Emile Gagnan developed the first self-contained underwater 
breathing apparatus (SCUBA) unit, the Aqua Lung (Acott 1999). Not long after 
the Aqua Lung came onto the market, divers began seeking shipwrecks for the 
adventure and the profits to be made from the salvage of artifacts. In saltwater 
environments, wooden ships decay quickly; however, many steel-hulled vessels 
and fresh-water wrecks remain intact long after sinking, allowing divers the 
opportunity to venture inside. Since many of the desirable artifacts for recovery 
lay inside these wrecks, divers soon began to enter them—sometimes never to 
return alive. This is shipwreck penetration exploration. Compared to external 
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shipwreck survey, the rewards for such exploration, as well as the risks, are 
great.  
2. Importance of Shipwreck Interior Exploration 
Today, shipwreck interior exploration is important for reasons beyond the 
simple thrill of traveling to an extreme environment. The capability to explore 
shipwreck interiors is potentially beneficial to a number of organizations, 
including the Department of Defense, the archaeological community, the 
commercial salvage industry, and agencies concerned with the exploration of 
marine environments, such as Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. The 
following list details some specific examples of the benefit of wreck interior 
exploration for each of these types of organizations. 
• The Department of Defense may be interested in the collection of 
intelligence from foreign wrecks, the location and salvage of certain 
objects within wrecks, conducting rescue operations for survivors 
within new wrecks and conducting hull inspections internally for 
usability determination or forensic examination.  
• Archaeologists may be interested in the capability to systematically 
explore, map, and recover artifacts from wreck interiors. Artifacts 
recovered from inside wrecks are sometimes the only way to 
identify the wreck.  
• The commercial salvage industry may be interested in the 
identification of wrecks as well as the location and recovery of 
objects within wrecks. 
• Exploration organizations may be interested in the development of 
the technologies and processes necessary for wreck interior 
exploration.  
Despite the potential for this capability, very few options currently exist for 
granting the explorer or salvager access to these remote places. One new and 
rapidly developing technological field, however, offers promise. Unmanned 
undersea vehicles may be the key to unlocking the mysteries of these 
unreachable places. 
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3. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) are a type of unmanned vehicle, 
similar to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs), all of which are often collectively referred to, albeit non-technically, as 
drones. UUVs are further divided into two primary categories; remotely operated 
vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). ROVs, which 
have been in operation for decades, depend upon a human operator to pilot the 
vehicle, and they are typically connected by a fiber optic tether to the host 
station, which may be located on platforms such as a dock, boat, or submarine. 
ROVs are generally used for close-quarters operations. The AUV, by contrast, is 
a much newer form of technology that does not principally rely on a human 
operator. AUVs are particularly well suited for open-ocean survey missions. The 
degree of autonomy of an AUV may be variable, depending on the level of 
control desired.  
The development of UUV technology is particularly important to the U.S. 
Navy. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy and OPNAV N77 (Submarine 
Warfare Division) chartered the Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Master Plan 
(UUVMP) in 2000. This document was updated in 2004 with expanded mission 
and technology recommendations, using Sea Power 21 for guidance. The latest 
update has not been made public. Of note, this thesis is directly relevant to two of 
the nine sub-pillar capabilities established in the UUVMP document: Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), which ranks first on the list in 
importance, and Inspection and Identification, which ranks fourth. Of the six 
recommendations established by the UUVMP, four are particularly relevant to 
this work: 1) the development of a man-portable (<100lbs) class of UUV, 2) the 
development of standards and implementation of modularity, 3) the increase of 
UUV technology experimentation, 4) the fielding of these systems in the fleet.  
 5 
4. Importance of AUVs 
The use of an AUV becomes necessary when a vehicle is required to 
make decisions and execute tasks without the direct command of a human 
operator. In the exploration of unknown extreme environments, AUVs are often a 
crucial tool. An extreme environment is one that is unsupportive of human life, 
thereby requiring significant technological intervention to protect the explorer 
from the environment, or requiring complete substitution of the robot for the 
human explorer. The shipwreck interior environment, the exploration of which is 
central to this thesis, is an extreme environment. The specific threats posed to a 
diver or vehicle within the shipwreck interior, as well as the capability gaps of 
existing technology toward achieving this objective, will be discussed in detail in 
a later chapter. Some shipwreck interiors are possible to explore using a human 
explorer with appropriate training and equipment, but many are not. Some AUVs 
can also operate without the use of a tether, which has drawbacks, but provides 
the significant advantage over ROVs of reducing the entanglement hazard. 
Although the use of an AUV to explore shipwreck interiors has not, to the 
author’s knowledge, truly been achieved, the use of an AUV would eliminate the 
risk of loss of life to the wreck while presenting the potential for efficient interior 
exploration; thus, it is of great importance to this study.  
B. CONTRIBUTION 
A sound understanding of the objective of this work, in addition to the 
relevant research questions it hopes to answer, is necessary before addressing 
the contribution of this work to the body of knowledge.  
1. Objective 
The intent of this thesis is to develop, using the systems engineering 
process, a functional analysis and a set of requirements, key performance 
parameters, and high-level architectural tradeoffs for an AUV capable of 
shipwreck interior exploration.  
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2. Research Questions 
The following questions are addressed in this thesis:  
• What type of challenging AUV mission might be of interest to the 
Department of the Navy?  
• What high-level alternatives exist for such a mission?  
• What are the high-level essential tasks for such a mission? 
• What are some of the potential stakeholder’s effective needs?  
• What would the scope of such a mission look like?  
• What are the relevant concerns and objectives?  
• What are the characteristics of the architecture and methodology 
employed by existing AUVs for the exploration and mapping of 
other unexplored three-dimensional environments?  
• What are the corresponding capability gaps?  
• What are some of the expected mission constraints, operating 
environments and threats?  
• What are the functions and requirements of an effective AUV 
solution?  
• What key tradeoffs should be considered in the architecture 
synthesis? 
3. Importance to the General Body of Knowledge 
This thesis is intended to provide a systematic approach to the 
development of an AUV architecture suitable for the exploration of shipwreck 
interiors. The study will provide a set of design requirements, architectural 
considerations that may prove beneficial for the future development of such a 
vehicle.  
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Familiarity with the scope, limitations, and assumptions of this thesis will 
serve as a useful roadmap to the reader and, therefore, deserve brief discussion 
before developing the research methods in the next section. 
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1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is contained within the upper-left half of the 
systems engineering V-diagram shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  Systems Engineering Life Cycle V-Model 
 
Adapted from: MITRE. 2015. “The Evolution of Systems Engineering.” Accessed 
Nov. 7. http://www.mitre.org/publications/systems-engineering-guide/systems-
engineering-guide/the-evolution-of-systems. 
The concept development begins with the design reference mission and 
high-level analysis of alternatives. The stakeholder analysis and project scope 
define the concept boundaries and objectives. Next, the functional analysis leads 
to the generation of requirements. Finally, from the requirements, key 
performance parameters, and architectural tradeoffs are analyzed. This area in 
the systems development life cycle was chosen as the focus of this work 
because the lack of AUVs designed for the purpose of wreck interior exploration, 
or even remotely capable of it, makes the architectural development interesting, 
highly flexible, and important. The preliminary and detailed design of the resulting 
AUV architecture would be a fascinating natural progression of this work. It is the 




Few AUVs exist with anything close to the capabilities required for 
conducting a wreck penetration mission. Since AUVs themselves are a relatively 
new technology, little literature exists on the subject of their potential use to 
explore wreck interiors. That which does is largely represented in the AUV 
exploration and mapping systems literature review of Chapter III. The author also 
has limited first-hand experience in the operation of AUV technology. It is the 
author’s hope that this work’s references will prove helpful for the AUV system 
designer seeking knowledge of the technology and techniques required of wreck 
interior exploration.  
3. Assumptions 
The intended audience for this thesis is the system engineer, domain 
engineer, or acquisitions officer interested in the development of an AUV solution 
to shipwreck interior exploration. A general understanding of the systems 
engineering discipline is also assumed.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this thesis is to implement the systems engineering process in 
order to achieve a high-level architectural design for an AUV capable of 
shipwreck penetration, mapping and surveillance. The primary guidance for the 
approach pursued in this thesis came from the textbooks Systems Engineering 
and Analysis, Fifth Edition, 2011 by Blanchard and Fabrycky, and The Art of 
Systems Architecting, Third Edition, 2009 by Maier and Rechtin, as well as 
lecture notes from the courses SE3100, Fundamentals of Systems Engineering, 
taught by Professor Fotis A. Papoulias and SE4150, System Architecting, taught 
by Professor Gregory A. Miller at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2014. The 
principal effort of the thesis lies in the systematic and thorough application the 
individual tasks of the systems engineering process to the specific reference 
mission and the communication of the results in the most effective format 
available. Furthermore, much effort also rests in the capturing of as many 
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possibilities for a given task as possible. One example is the list of logistical 
constraints at the end of Chapter III. Many other items could certainly appear on 
a comprehensive list for a fully developed system. This list simply represents the 
author’s best guess at the considerations most applicable to this work. The 
remainder of the effort generally lies in the artistic organization of the results of 
each analysis in a way that is most helpful in communicating the clearest view of 
the problem space as it develops.  
In Chapter II, the process begins with a design reference mission (DRM), 
a high-level analysis of alternatives, mission planning considerations and the 
generation of a high-level essential task list. The problem space will then be 
explored in Chapter III, beginning with an analysis of stakeholder needs and an 
exploration of the project scope. The literature review will then explore four novel 
AUVs, identifying important architecture and methodology considerations. 
Research for the literature review, and other sections containing technology 
research, is conducted through topic searches using the search engine Google 
Scholar to locate the relevant academic papers and journal entries. The work by 
Fairfield et al. is particularly useful for understanding the implementation of 
simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) methodologies of autonomous 
vehicles operating in unknown three-dimensional environments. The work by 
Durrant-Whyte et al. is also helpful toward this end. Finally, the work by Salumae 
et al. is beneficial for insight into the physical design of a wreck-penetration-
capable AUV. The literature review incorporates the ideas put forward by these 
and other authors and organizes the effort toward the goal of defining the 
requirements of a sophisticated AUV with a specific and demanding mission. 
Following the literature review, the capability gaps between the existing 
and needed technology will be examined. The constraints will be developed, 
identifying operational conditions and threats. In Chapter IV, a functional 
decomposition and requirements generation will lead to measures of 
effectiveness and key performance parameters of an appropriate system 
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architecture. In Chapter V, architecture tradeoffs will be considered. Finally, in 
Chapter VI, the conclusion and recommendations for future work will be made. 
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II. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
In this chapter, the design reference mission, upon which the remainder of 
the thesis is based, is developed. This reference mission enables the subsequent 
development of a high level analysis of alternatives, general mission planning 
and the identification of constraints. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A design reference mission (DRM) is a systems engineering tool used to 
assist the development of a new system by providing a representative mission 
profile. The DRM generated in this section will serve as the basis for the problem 
space exploration, and the functional analysis and design requirements, to follow. 
Numerous potential missions for an autonomous vehicle, capable of the internal 
exploration of shipwrecks, exist. The following reference mission is based upon 
the circumstances surrounding an actual sinking that occurred in 1989. The 
details of that event are given in the following section. This particular reference 
mission was chosen because it represents an extraordinary, rather than most 
likely, opportunity for the use of an AUV, and, thus, provides the basis for the 
design of a highly versatile AUV. The wreck described in the following section 
presents an incredibly challenging mission—far beyond the capability of humans 
and ROVs. Nevertheless, in order to justify the use of the AUV in a disciplined 
manner, other possible high-level alternatives will be considered immediately 
following the reference mission. 
B. BACKGROUND 
On April 7, 1989, the Komsomolets (K-278), a Russian nuclear attack 
submarine operating in the Norwegian Sea, went down after unsuccessfully 
fighting a fire in its aft compartment #7 (see Figure 1 under Target Description) 
caused by a ruptured high-pressure air line (Montgomery 1995). Montgomery 
(1995) notes that the disaster, which killed 42 of 69 crewmembers, sparked 
intense interest in the intelligence community. The submarine was carrying two 
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torpedoes with plutonium warheads. The potential for radiation leakage has since 
caused significant environmental concern. The Akademik Mstislav Keldysh 
oceanographic rescue vessel found Komsomolets two months after it sank using 
its submersibles, Mir 1 and Mir 2 (Montgomery 1995). In 1991, the explorers 
using the Mir submersibles determined that the pressure hull was breached in 
several places, the reactor was slowly leaking, and the torpedo tube hatches 
were open. Subsequent surveys, using technology including cameras developed 
at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, found additional damage, including a 20 
ft. crack in the torpedo compartment hull, possibly caused by an explosion of 
hydrogen gas leaked from storage batteries. Montgomery also notes that in order 
to prevent further radiation contamination, the Russian government decided in 
1994 to seal the submarine with a gelatinous compound of unknown 
composition.  
C. TARGET DESCRIPTION  
According to the Federation of American Scientists (2000), The Russian 
Navy commissioned Komsomolets, the first Russian Project 685 Plavnik (Mike-
class) submarine in 1984. The technologically advanced double-hulled submarine, 
described by the Federation as 117.5 m. long, 107 m. at the beam, with an 8–9 m. 
draft, was to become a test-bed for new technologies, capable of delivering 
torpedoes as well as conventional or nuclear cruise missiles. The boat is divided 
into seven compartments, as depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  K-278 Structural Layout 
 
Source: Federation of American Scientists. 2000. “Project 685 Plavnik Mike 
Class.” http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rus/685.htm. 
The Federation of American Scientists also notes that the submarine was 
capable of diving to greater depths than any other military submarine—in excess 
of 3,000 ft.—due to the strength of its double hull, including an inner hull made of 
titanium. It is believed that the boat used a single 190 MW OK-650 b-3 
pressurized water reactor in combination with two steam turbines with a 
maximum output of 47,000 shp and a single 7-blade screw (Federation of 
American Scientists 2000). The boat is assumed to have been capable of 
carrying an unknown number of SS-N-15 Starfish RPK-2 Viyoga and SS-N-16 
Stallion missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads. The boat has six 21 in. 
torpedo tubes that were capable of firing conventional or nuclear-warhead 
torpedoes. The Federation of American Scientists also writes that the submarine 
may have employed the Snoop Head surface search radar and the Shark Gill 
active sonar.  
D. ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION 
K-278 is located approximately 180 miles south of Medvezhy Island 
(Sagalevitch 1995) on the floor of the Norwegian Sea (approximate LAT: °73°42 
LON: 13° 23) as shown in Figure 3 (The Wreck Site 2015): 
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Figure 3.  K-278 Wreck Location 
 
Source: Wreck Site. 2015. “Komsomolets (K-278)[+1989].” Accessed Oct.14. 
http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?115318. 
The continental slope in the area is approximately 1 degree (Hoibraten, 
Haugan and Thoresen 2003). Hoibraten et al. note that the boat rests at a depth 
of 1,697 m. on top of approximately 40 m. of sediment. Radiation levels in the 
surrounding water are low, but may increase as time progresses and materials 
corrode. The local currents at the site vary, but average approximately 0.2 m/s; 
the highest velocity recorded was 1.5 m/s. The same authors also note that the 
temperature at the wreck site is approximately -0.8 deg. C. The total ambient 
water pressure at this depth is approximately 2,500 psi (Calctool 2008). 
E. REFERENCE MISSION 
The reference mission for this thesis will incorporate the historic 
Komsomolets target at its actual location in the context of the following 
clandestine scenario:  
Intelligence community sources have recently intercepted the encrypted 
distress signals of a Russian nuclear submarine. After a subsequent, rapid 
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search by air and surface assets, the wreck of a Mike-class submarine has been 
located (an image of the wreck is shown in Figure 4). Valuable intelligence may 
be recovered from a covert systematic exploration and mapping of the interior of 
the wreck. An external survey, conducted via a tethered ROV launched from a 
U.S. submarine shows a large hole in the hull around the boat’s midsection, but 
due the depth of the wreck, the extreme environmental conditions, and the 
myriad hazards associated with internal exploration, the use of divers is outside 
the limits of current technology. 
Figure 4.  Sunken Mike Class Submarine 
 
Source: Federation of American Scientists. 2000. “Project 685 Plavnik Mike 
Class.” Accessed Oct. 14. http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rus/685.htm. 
 The Defense Intelligence Agency wishes to collect platform-specific 
intelligence from the interior spaces of the target submarine. This may include 
video reconnaissance of various instruments in separate compartments. Small 
physical objects of interest have also been identified that may contain valuable 
intelligence if recovered, and if one or more of these “targets of opportunity” are 
discovered, a recovery of the object is desired. Additionally, a previously 
unknown protuberance has been spotted near the bow, upon external survey, 
that may contain new sensor technology. It is critical that the precise location of 
all recorded objects of interest be known. To preserve secrecy, it is also critical 
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that the exploration be conducted at depth and in minimal time, leaving no visible 
trace of exploration if possible. 
1. Primary Objective 
The primary objective is to penetrate the submarine and collect 
intelligence, while mapping the interior spaces.  
2. Potential Intelligence Collection Targets 
Intelligence sources express specific interest in visual intelligence, which 
may be collectable via sensors such as cameras, which may include: 
• engineering space monitors and equipment, including reduction 
gear specifics, such as the diameter of shafts and the number of 
teeth on gears 
• SONAR room monitors and equipment 
• radio room monitors and equipment 
• missile control room monitors and equipment 
• control room monitors and equipment, including the periscope 
• torpedoes 
Further, the sources indicate additional valuable intelligence may be obtained via 
the recovery of small targets of opportunity, including: 
• countermeasures 
• emergency distress beacons 
• removable media (such as targeting disks) or manuals 
F. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
With the DRM established, it is now prudent to consider the potential 
alternatives to AUVs. This analysis of high-level alternatives aims at the early 
identification of as many solutions, no matter how radical, as possible. The 
candidates should be analyzed to in order to justify the selection of the initial 
design path to pursue. In this section, four high-level alternatives—traditional 
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human shipwreck penetration, human shipwreck penetration with the aid of 
atmospheric suits, use of ROVs, and raising the target submarine—will be briefly 
analyzed by examining their major benefits and drawbacks. Upon conclusion, the 
selection of the most promising alternative will become the first major design 
decision and determine the course of the work to follow. 
1. Traditional Human Shipwreck Penetration 
Perhaps the most obvious option for the exploration and mapping of 
shipwrecks is the use of human divers. Shipwreck penetration and exploration 
has, until recently, been the exclusive domain of a very advanced, elite type of 
diver generally referred to in the diving community as a “technical diver” or 
“wreck penetration diver” to differentiate the diver from recreational divers who 
may explore the exteriors of shipwrecks, but do not engage in diving in conditions 
where decompression is required, the use of a reel and line for navigation is 
required, or where the escape route is not naturally illuminated. A wreck 
penetration diver, using closed-circuit rebreathing equipment, is depicted in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  A Traditional Wreck Penetration Diver 
 
Source: Richie Kohler. 2015. “A Life Underwater.” Accessed Nov. 4. http://www 
.richiekohler.com/gallery/a-life-underwater/nggallery/page/1. 
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Wreck-penetration technical divers go to these extreme environments for various 
reasons, including among them the recovery of artifacts for archeological study 
or personal gain, the identification of an unknown wreck, and the simple thrill of 
going to a place so extreme that only a handful of people can venture there and 
survive. The latter type are like an aquatic version of those who ascend Mt. 
Everest—in fact, entering the shipwreck Andria Doria has been commonly 
referred to as “the Mount Everest of scuba diving” for years in the technical diving 
community.  
a. Benefits of Traditional Human Shipwreck Penetration 
The techniques of wreck-penetration diving have been thoroughly studied 
and refined over many years, and much knowledge, often written in blood, has 
been added to the discipline. Until the advent of ROVs, the only way to explore 
the interiors of shipwrecks was to send a human into that dark and dangerous 
abyss. Once inside, wreck divers have generated maps, recovered valuable 
artifacts, and even acquired the data necessary to determine the wreck’s name. 
Thus, the principal benefit of human exploration is that the power of human 
cognition can be directly inserted into the extreme environment. One need not 
depend on the robustness of an autonomous vehicle’s decision-making 
algorithm, or on the ability of a remote operator to visually identify a target 
through degraded media collected by sensors. Certainly, under present 
technology, the capability of a human diver’s problem-solving judgment exceeds 
that of the autonomous vehicle—but that may not always be so.  
b. Drawbacks to Traditional Human Shipwreck Penetration 
Although the potential benefits are significant, the risk to the diver is 
extremely high. Altered mental state due to extreme stress and adverse 
physiological responses to breathing gas mixtures at depth are very real 
possibilities. Entanglement, limited visibility due to sediment disturbance, injury 
from cuts and abrasions on sharp wreckage, limited air supply, entrapment due 
to structural collapse and simply becoming lost are some examples of the many 
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threats to the diver. The maximum depth technical divers may venture to, which 
varies greatly depending on the individual diver’s equipment and capabilities but 
is generally much less than a thousand feet, is a significant limiting factor.  
2. Human Shipwreck Penetration using Atmospheric Suits 
Atmospheric suits enable divers to operate under a single atmosphere of 
ambient pressure by physically resisting the external water pressure with a hard, 
exoskeleton-like suit. The complexity of the suit, particularly in the architecture of 
the joints and internal life-support system, makes these suits relatively expensive 
and bulky. The atmospheric suit has been around for decades, but recent 
advancements have made them much more efficient. One of the latest and most 
advanced designs, the Exosuit, produced by Nuytco Research Ltd., is a 
particularly capable atmospheric suit. The Exosuit is depicted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6.  Exosuit Atmospheric Diving System 
 
Source: Nuytco Research Ltd. 2015. “Products: Exosuit The Future of Ocean 
Exploration.” Accessed November 9. http://nuytco.com/products/exosuit/. 
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a. Benefits of Human Shipwreck Penetration Using Atmospheric 
Suits 
The benefits of diving, in general, with an atmospheric suit are 
substantial—particularly when a human is needed to directly execute tasks and 
great depths or lengthy missions are required. The Exosuit is rated to a 
maximum operating depth of 1000 ft. and uses a carbon dioxide scrubber that 
can operate for 50 hours (Nuytco 2015). The atmospheric suit eliminates many of 
the dangers of traditional human technical diving discussed previously. By 
eliminating the pressure of the water from the diver’s chest, the diver is able to 
breathe air at normal atmospheric pressure. The dissolution of gas in the blood 
and tissues of the body is not accelerated, and the need to decompress, as well 
as the threat of the bends or adverse reaction to increased-partial-pressure 
breathing gasses is eliminated. The Exosuit uses an A536 aluminum alloy shell 
(Nuytco 2015). The nature of an exoskeleton suit also reduces the chances of 
injury to the diver from direct contact with the environment.  
b. Drawbacks to Human Shipwreck Penetration Using 
Atmospheric Suits 
The most obvious drawback to the use of such a suit for the exploration of 
shipwreck interiors, however, is the bulkiness and corresponding lack of 
maneuverability required for such an environment. The Exosuit is significantly 
lighter than predecessor atmospheric suits. Nevertheless, it still weighs between 
500 and 600 lbs, depending on the configuration (Nuytco 2015). The bulkiness of 
the life-support system on the back of the suit, combined with the tether, makes 
the Exosuit incapable of typical shipwreck penetration missions. It is conceivable 
that such a system could be used to explore wreck interiors where large, 
generally entanglement-free areas exist, such as an open hanger deck of an 
aircraft carrier. It is also conceivable that atmospheric suit technology may 
continue to advance, producing even lighter, more flexible, and less bulky 
systems than the Exosuit. Significant advancements, however, seem unlikely 
given that the need for atmospheric suits is typically driven by the commercial 
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diving industry, largely servicing open-ocean industrial systems like gas and oil 
platforms. This type of work, where deep water and lengthy missions combine 
with the need for direct human intervention in tasks, is ideal for current 
atmospheric suits and does not demand the extremely low-profile suit that would 
be necessary for wreck penetration missions.  
3. ROV Shipwreck Penetration 
Remotely Operated Vehicles are an obvious option for the exploration of 
wreck interiors. Few ROVs, however, have ever been flown inside a wreck. 
Perhaps the most famous ROV to be flown inside a wreck was Jason Junior, or 
JJ, which was operated remotely via tether from the mini-submersible Alvin while 
exploring the wreck of the RMS Titanic in 1986. JJ is depicted in Figure 7 along 
with some of the remarkable images it captured inside that most famous wreck. 
Although it was an incredible piloting feat, JJ’s flight into the Titanic was 
restricted to relatively large, open spaces such as the main stairwell—far more 
benign than the interior of a submarine. 
Figure 7.  ROV Jason Junior’s Exploration of Titanic’s Interior Spaces 
 
Adapted from: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. 2010. “A Titanic Tale: 
Sellers, William. 2010.” A Titanic Tale: A Former Alvin Pilot Recalls His 1986 
Dives On the Shipwreck.” Oceanus Magazine, Sept. 2. Accessed Nov. 9, 2015. 
http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/feature/a-titanic-tale; National Geographic. 2015. 
“Unseen Titanic—Gallery: Then and Now.” http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com 
/2012/04/titanic/cameron-gallery#/5. 
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a. Benefits of ROV Shipwreck Penetration 
ROVs have been used to explore the exteriors of many shipwrecks. The 
principal benefit to the use of an ROV lies in the ability to control the vehicle 
directly through the communication link provided by its tether. The operator has 
access to real-time information, which may include sonar imaging data and high-
definition video. The human operator can fly the vehicle, maneuvering around 
obstacles, collecting samples, and returning to the base station as the operator 
sees fit. Less processing power and physical space on the vehicle need be 
devoted to navigation, since the tether can connect the vehicle to essentially 
limitless processing power at the base station. ROVs are a generally cheaper 
solution when compared to AUVs, and have been operating effectively in less 
challenging environments for many years. These benefits make a solid case for 
an enhanced ROV architecture as a solution to this reference mission. 
b. Drawbacks to ROV Shipwreck Penetration 
Despite the many benefits of ROVs, significant drawbacks plague this 
option. The principal drawback to the ROV is also one of its main advantages—
the tether. The tether presents a substantial hurdle for the safe penetration of a 
shipwreck. The risk of entanglement or damage to the tether is severe. If the 
tether is damaged, complete loss of the vehicle may occur, unless another 
means of communication, such as through-water radio-frequency 
communication, is available. Wireless communication through a wreck presents 
additional logistical concerns. Furthermore, should the tether become entangled, 
the host vessel is in danger of becoming anchored to the wreck if the tether-
jettisoning mechanism fails. Another concern is the lack of sufficient situational 
awareness for the pilot to successfully navigate the wreck interior. ROVs are 
typically flown visually, either by direct observation of the vehicle, or through a 
real-time video feed from the vehicle. If the vehicle stirs up debris within the 
wreck, or if the field of view is too narrow, the vehicle could become lost or 
entangled within the wreck.  
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4. Covert Raising of the Submarine 
The covert raising of a soviet submarine was attempted in 1974. The 
Glomar Explorer was designed as a part of an effort by the CIA, code-named 
Project Jennifer, to retrieve the Soviet K-129, a Golf-class diesel submarine that 
sank in 1968 in approximately 17,000 ft. of water 750 miles from Hawaii 
(Schindler 2015). According to Schindler, the U.S. Navy intercepted encoded 
transmissions that indicated that an explosion had taken place, but the 
submarine was likely mostly intact. The submarine carried a number of nuclear 
missiles and torpedoes (Schindler 2015). The Glomar Explorer, funded by 
Howard Hughes, was to operate under the cover story of manganese mining 
operations. The Glomar Explorer and a Soviet Golf-class submarine are depicted 
in Figure 8.  
Figure 8.  The Glomar Explorer and a Soviet Golf-Class Submarine 
 
Adapted from: The National Security Archive, The George Washington 
University. 2010. “Project Azorian: The CIA’s Declassified History of the Glomar 
Explorer.” Accessed Nov. 9, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb305/. 
The enormous vessel employed a giant claw designed to lift the 
submarine. Upon securing the prize within the claw, the entire wreck would be 
hauled up by cables to a “moon pool” hidden within the Glomar Explorer 
(Schindler 2015). Schindler notes that the operation, however, did not entirely 
succeed, as the claw became damaged during an impact with the ocean floor 
and subsequently failed after raising the submarine about a third of the way to 
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the surface. Part of the submarine was recovered, along with some intelligence, 
but most of the prize was lost (Schindler 2015).  
a. Benefits of Covertly Raising the Submarine 
The primary benefit raising the submarine is the more complete collection 
of contents of the vessel—at least as much of the vessel as is actually recovered. 
With an intact vessel safely brought into government custody, the systematic, 
thorough retrieval of material can be conducted. Large items, otherwise 
unobtainable, such as missiles, torpedoes, reduction gear, or even whole 
reactors can be obtained. Having the intact submarine is the gold standard for a 
collection effort.  
b. Drawbacks to Covertly Raising the Submarine 
The primary drawback of raising the submarine is the sheer magnitude of 
the effort involved. The expense of a capable host vessel is amplified by the 
enormous support required and difficulty of keeping such a large operation 
secret. The simple fact that it has been tried before also decreases the 
probability of covertly implementing this alternative.  
5. Alternative Selection 
The severity of this reference mission drives a solid case for the design of 
a suitable AUV. The depth of the target (in excess of 5,000 ft.) and narrowness of 
passageways prevents the use of human divers—even those incorporating 
atmospheric suits. The depth of penetration into, and complexity of, the wreck’s 
interior severely restricts the use of traditional ROV technology. Raising the 
submarine, a task of immense proportion, would almost certainly jeopardize the 
effort due to the highly visible nature of such an operation. The decision to 
proceed with the AUV design effort is justified. 
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G. MISSION PLANNING 
With the selection of an alternative established, general mission planning 
should be commenced in order to identify the principal assumptions and tasks 
that will guide the effort.  
1. Assumptions 
To begin formulating a systematic solution to this assigned task, it is 
necessary to frame a set of initial assumptions:  
• The vehicle is to be launched and recovered covertly, preferably at 
depth from a large, manned, submersible asset such as a 
submarine. 
• The target submarine is reasonably intact; damage inflicted to the 
structure from the initial casualty that caused the sinking, as well as 
the violence of the sinking itself, has not caused the vessel to 
completely crush or break apart, thus, the vehicle has sufficient 
internal spaces to explore.  
• The submarine has been precisely located, and an external survey, 
using the vehicle itself or other technology, has been conducted.  
• An opening in the hull, large enough for the AUV to enter, exists. If 
an open hatch or damaged hull opportunity does not exist, a breach 
of sufficient size to allow vehicle access must be created in 
advance.  
2. High-Level Essential Task List 
To successfully execute the assigned mission, the vehicle must possess a 
number of key capabilities that will be formalized in the requirements analysis to 
follow. In order to achieve a robust functional analysis, critical aspects of the 
mission execution must be established. The following high-level essential task list 
provides the starting point for a functional analysis in support of the primary 
objective: 
1. The submarine will launch the vehicle from depth to preserve the 
operation’s secrecy.  
2. The vehicle will navigate to the hull opening, stabilize, and enter the 
wreck.  
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3. As the vehicle enters the wreck, it will record the environment using 
appropriate sensors.  
4. The vehicle will systematically record its position as it additively 
builds the interior map of the submarine.  
5. The vehicle will propel itself in a manner that causes minimal 
environmental disturbance. 
6. When an internal space (cavity) has been mapped, the vehicle will 
maneuver to the next search area and continue the exploration. 
7. When the vehicle encounters an obstacle, it will determine the 
appropriate action to defeat that obstacle, execute the task, and 
continue or abort the search as necessary. 
8. The vehicle will recognize a target of opportunity and collect, or 
mark that opportunity for future collection, on the map. If operating 
on a tether, the vehicle may be commanded to manipulate or 
collect objects, or return to the crew for any reason.  
9. If operating untethered, the vehicle will monitor its health and 
remaining power and return to the crew if unable to continue its 
mission, upon reaching a minimum power threshold, or upon 
completion of the mission. 
H. CONSTRAINTS 
The system must be designed with great consideration for the constraints 
of the mission. These constraints include a combination of expected operating 
conditions, logistics considerations, time requirements and threats.   
1. Expected Operating Conditions 
System operating conditions are defined as “the variables of the 
operational environment or situation that may affect performance. Conditions 
impact the ability to perform a task.” (NPS SE3100 Module 2, Slide 22, Spring 
2014 Lecture). This section examines the expected operating conditions of the 
vehicle during the four major phases of the mission.  
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a. Submarine Loading and Transport Phase 
After procurement, the system, and all the necessary support systems, will 
be transferred to the host submarine. During the transit, the system will likely 
experience changes in temperature and humidity as it is moved on or off of the 
submarine. The components will be transported through relatively small hatches, 
carried through passageways, and hauled up and down ladder wells; thus, it is 
likely that the system components, in their transportable configuration, will need 
to be relatively small, and may be inadvertently subjected to shock along the 
way. During the submarine transport phase, the vehicle and support systems will 
be expected to be storable in the minimum space practical. Upon deployment for 
the mission, the vehicle and supporting systems will be unpacked and set up for 
operations. Interoperability and compatibility with the shipboard environment is 
crucial to mission success.  
b. Submarine Launch Phase 
At the beginning of the mission, the vehicle will be launched from the 
submarine and subjected to rapid changes in temperature and pressure. As the 
host submarine will be limited in the depth at which it can descend and keep 
station, the journey to the target submarine is likely to entail a significant change 
in depth and may require a significant lateral distance to travel as well. The 
conditions experienced during this phase may include significant increased 
pressure corresponding to depth change, strong currents with the potential for 
directional changes, and salinity changes, which may affect buoyancy and sonar 
operating characteristics. 
c. Target Exploration Phase 
The target exploration phase begins when the vehicle penetrates the outer 
hull of the submarine and enters the interior environment. This phase can 
reasonably be assumed to be the highest-risk phase. The interior sea conditions 
may be similar to the last stages of the submarine launch phase, at the entrance 
to the wreck, with an increased risk of entanglement, silt-out, strong and 
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unpredictable currents, abrasion, puncture and shock damage, and toxic 
chemicals. Each of these threats will be discussed in turn shortly. The vehicle 
must operate autonomously once the penetration commences, unless it operates 
on a tether. The vehicle will continuously localize as it maps the interior, 
collecting intelligence data via sensors or physical collection until it reaches a 
decision to return. Upon exiting the hull, the target exploration phase is complete 
and the recovery phase begins.  
d. Recovery Phase 
The recovery phase is essentially the reverse of the launch phase—
beginning with the vehicle’s return to the host submarine. The vehicle must 
renegotiate all the hazards of currents, pressure, salinity, and buoyancy change, 
and return to a precise physical location on the host submarine without impacting 
the submarine’s hull or fouling its propulsion system along the way. The physical 
docking or loading of the vehicle into the submarine presents a risk for shock and 
physical damage. Once the vehicle is recovered, and before being brought into 
human contact, it must be tested for radiation or hazardous material 
contamination, if exposure to such material is suspected, and decontaminated as 
necessary The data collected must be retrieved from the system and processed. 
The vehicle must be inspected, cleaned, serviced, repaired and refitted for 
redeployment or stowed for sea as appropriate. The recovery phase is complete 
when the vehicle has been brought aboard safely and the collected data has 
been processed.  
2. Logistics 
The following list delineates the primary logistics concerns for the mission-
execution phase of the system’s life cycle. 
• packaging for transportation to the submarine facilities 
• packaging for transportation onboard the submarine 
• submarine interoperability requirements, particularly power and 
servicing 
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• hazardous-materials storage compliance for shipboard storage 
• maintenance tools, expendables, and procedures 
• operator training resources 
• spare parts 
• data processing tools 
• manpower 
Each of these items should be considered, with respect to the stakeholder’s 
needs, during the creation of the system requirements.  
3. Time Constraints 
Although specific time constraints will be dependent on the individual 
mission, and a prediction of such requirements is outside the scope of this work, 
the nature of the reference mission requires that the mission be executed with 
minimal delay. The sensitivity of the mission necessitates the rapid exploitation of 
the target with the minimum opportunity for the adversary to discover the 
compromise. The loitering of the host submarine in the wreck vicinity increases 
the risk to the boat and its crew. Since the vehicle may be required to execute 
multiple sorties in order to provide adequate intelligence, the process should be 
initiated as soon as it is safe to do so. The time-sensitive nature of the mission 
necessitates deliberate planning during the system preliminary design phase to 
ensure high usability, capability, and reliability.  
4. Threats  
During the mission-execution phase, the vehicle will be subjected to a host 
of environmental conditions that may destroy the vehicle or ruin the mission. The 
interior environment of a shipwreck, especially the one detailed in the DRM, is 
extreme, and the risk of loss of the vehicle is very high. A thorough 
understanding of the threats to the vehicle and the mission is essential to a 
survivable design. 
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a. Threats to the Vehicle  
Any shipwreck interior should be considered a potential operating 
environment for this system in order to maximize operational flexibility. The 
general characteristics of shipwreck environments are well known through the 
experience of technical wreck-penetration scuba divers. 
Figure 9.  A Submarine Wreck Interior 
 
An example shipwreck interior. This image was taken inside U-869, a WWII 
German U-boat wreck. Note the complexity of the structure and the hazards 
imposed to divers and vehicles via entanglement and sediment disruption. 
Source: Richie Kohler. 2015. “U-869 Gallery.” Accessed Nov. 4. http://www. 
richiekohler.com/gallery/u-869-gallery/. 
The shipwreck interior, such as the one depicted in Figure 9, which has 
killed divers, is indeed a hostile world. Its lethal factors include: 
Entanglement: The sea begins reclaiming the elements of a ship 
immediately upon her sinking. The increased ambient pressure, along with the 
violence of the event that caused the sinking, and the crash of the vessel as it 
impacts the seabed all damage the physical integrity of the wreck. Currents carry 
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debris and sediment throughout the spaces. Oxidation takes effect rapidly as 
surfaces never intended for immersion in salt water become exposed under high 
pressure. Coral and other sea life begin to inhabit and break down the structure. 
Even in a fresh wreck that has not had a significant period of time to deteriorate, 
the vessel will likely be oriented on the seabed in a way other than that which it 
was designed, causing gravitational stresses and a shifting of furniture and other 
debris, blocking passageways and turning the structure into a labyrinth. The 
breakdown of the structure causes myriad opportunities for entanglement and 
other entrapment of vehicles. This is perhaps the greatest risk faced by a vehicle 
(or diver) attempting to penetrate the wreck. 
Silt-out: The ocean currents will begin depositing sediment into the wreck 
interior as soon as the spaces flood. Over time, the oxidation and breakdown of 
the materials inside the wreck will further the accumulation. This buildup of 
sediment is easily disturbed, and when it is, it tends to billow out and fill the 
cavities of the wreck, quickly reducing the visibility. When human divers 
penetrate shipwrecks, this disturbance creates a potentially lethal situation 
should the diver become separated from his guide line. The disturbed curtain of 
silt becomes opaque quickly, even with the aid of lights. Indeed, lights can often 
make the situation worse, as the light reflects off of the particles in suspension 
near the diver or vehicle creating a brown or black glow. Examples abound of this 
exact phenomena killing wreck-penetration and cave divers. Silt-out is equally 
dangerous to the successful execution of an AUV penetration mission. The 
capability to conduct reconnaissance will depend on the use of sensors such as 
video, sonar or Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) imaging—a capability that 
will be destroyed if the environment is sufficiently disturbed.  
Strong/Unpredictable Currents: Local currents occur from the effects of 
tides, wave action, larger ocean currents and other effects. These currents may 
be significant during the transit to the submarine entrance. A great deal of power 
or alternate method of delivery may be required to get the vehicle to the target 
entrance location efficiently. Once inside the wreck, the vehicle may be subjected 
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to varied local currents as seawater moves unpredictably through the structure. 
The Venturi effect may cause a slight current to accelerate through narrowed 
passageways, possibly creating turbulent effects that may complicate vehicle 
control. Changes in current flow within the wreck may produce an unanticipated 
silt-out situation. If the vehicle is subjected to significant currents during the 
mission, battery capacity and propulsion power will be of great concern.  
Abrasion, Puncture and Shock Damage: Myriad opportunities exist for 
contact between the vehicle and the host or target submarine. During the 
mission, contact with substances as varied as sharp, jagged metallic structure, 
monofilament fishing nets, biological gelatinous material, aquatic plants and 
animal life, oil or fuel deposits, coral, sediment, shredded synthetic materials, and 
loose piping and wiring are all possible. Any sizeable vehicle will move with 
sufficient momentum to cause structural damage if it impacts a sharp, hard 
surface. If the vehicle is tethered for any portion of the penetration operation, and 
that tether is pulled through the wreck, the tether will almost certainly be 
subjected to severe risk of severing or abrading.  
Temperature Variations: The vehicle will be subjected to temperature 
variations inherent in deploying from a shipboard environment with an 
approximate ambient air temperature in the mid 60-degree Fahrenheit range to 
ocean water that may be near, or even slightly below, freezing. The vehicle may 
also travel through thermocline layers en route to the target. A rapid temperature 
change may adversely affect the vehicle in ways such as increasing stress on 
vehicle components, changing sonar behavior, reducing battery life and power 
available, reducing material elasticity, and degrading sensor operation. 
Pressure Variations: It is commonly accepted that a depth of 33 feet of 
seawater produces the equivalent of one atmosphere of ambient pressure. Most 
shipwrecks, therefore, exist at depths of many atmospheres of ambient pressure. 
At the depth of K-278 (1700 m. or approximately 5,577 ft.), the vehicle must 
undergo a pressure increase of approximately 169 atmospheres (170 
atmospheres of total pressure, or 2,500 psi). Any vacuum or volume of 
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compressible fluid, such as an air cavity within an exposed sensor, not 
sufficiently reinforced, may implode.  
Toxic Substances: As mentioned previously, the hazards of the 
shipwreck interior may include fluids and semi-solids as well as solid matter. 
Deposits of petroleum products such as lubricating oil, grease and fuel, 
decomposing bodies, and nuclear contamination may be encountered.  
Corrosion: As most shipwrecks of interest for the system can be 
expected to occur in saltwater, corrosion prevention will be a significant concern. 
Ocean salinity varies significantly from sea to sea. As salinity increases, so does 
the corrosive effect on the system.  
b. Threats to Mission Success  
The success of the mission is dependent on much more than the survival 
of the vehicle. Considerations for the risk of mission failure, given that the vehicle 
survives to be recovered, include: 
• Failing to collect the required data: An inability to properly map 
the target while executing the mission, or generating a map, but 
silting out the environment so much that it prevents the collection of 
video, are two possible concerns. 
• Compromising the collected intelligence due to vehicle 
signature at the target: Any trace of physical evidence, such as 
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III. PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION 
In this chapter, the problem space will be examined, in detail, to develop 
the foundation necessary for a robust architecture synthesis. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first task in this development is the identification of the system 
stakeholders and their needs. The stakeholder’s primitive desires will be refined 
and condensed into a set of effective needs statements. From the resulting set of 
effective needs statements, the scope of the project will be defined. In this critical 
step, system development and implementation responsibilities are divided among 
the appropriate stakeholders and the corresponding boundaries of the system 
architects are established. The operational environment and other key system 
attributes are defined, allowing the context and critical system interfaces to be 
established. With this knowledge, the principal design concerns are identified 
early, and in-scope and out-of-scope design capabilities are established in order 
to prevent scope creep. A review of the applicable literature for existing relevant 
systems is then presented, with a close examination of the architecture and 
capabilities of four appropriate AUVs. Following this analysis, the capability gaps 
are identified. At this point, the design concerns identified in the scope discussion 
may be validated upon comparison with the actual capability gaps of existing 
systems. Finally, the system constraints are examined through analysis of the 
expected operating conditions during each of the four mission phases, logistics 
concerns, time requirements, and threats to the system and the mission. 
B. STAKEHOLDER NEEDS ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the needs of system stakeholders is a crucial step in the 
systems engineering process. Without a thorough understanding of the actual, or 
effective, needs of stakeholders, the system architects risk developing a solution 
to the wrong problem. Even with a basic, or primitive, list of stakeholder wishes, 
the lack of careful consideration of the circumstances behind those wishes may 
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result in striving toward a sub-optimal solution founded on the natural bias of the 
stakeholder or the design team. In this section, an analysis of the needs of likely 
stakeholders is performed, in each case culminating in a needs statement 
summarizing and condensing the individual stakeholder’s effective needs into a 
single sentence.  
1. Stakeholder Identification 
A stakeholder may be defined as anyone with a vested interest in the 
system. This typically includes, at a minimum, clients, users, analysts, and others 
directly involved in the life cycle of the system. Identification of the system 
stakeholders is the first step in the stakeholder needs analysis. With a system of 
the scale and complexity required of this mission, the complete stakeholder list is 
likely very lengthy. An analysis of the needs of principal stakeholders will suffice, 
within the scope of this thesis, for the generation of a robust set of design 
requirements. The author anticipates the following principal stakeholders, and 
their respective interests, in the context of this DRM (the author makes no claim 
to the actual interests of any stakeholder in this list): 
Intelligence Agencies 
• CIA – The Central Intelligence Agency is interested in the collection 
of intelligence related to Russian strategic assets and the 
development of new methods to exploit or counter those assets. 
• DIA – The Defense Intelligence Agency is interested in the 
collection of intelligence that may increase the organization’s 
understanding of the capabilities of specific Russian submarine 
technology. 
• DOE – The Department of Energy is interested in the collection of 
intelligence related to the propulsion and strategic weapons 
capabilities of the Russian M-class submarine. 
• ONI – The Office of Naval Intelligence is interested in the collection 
of intelligence related to the lethality and survivability of the Russian 
M-class submarine, the tactics employed by the M-class 
submarine, as well as the tracking and deception of this and other 
types of Russian submarines.  
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Naval Agencies 
• COMNAVSUBFOR – The Commander, Naval Submarine Forces is 
interested in the doctrine, organization, training, materials, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) 
aspects of the mission that impact the naval submarine community 
mission, assets and personnel. 
• EOD – The naval Explosive Ordinance Disposal community is 
interested the system’s potential for supporting EOD missions and 
reducing risk through enhanced situational awareness. 
• ND – The Navy Diver community is interested in the system’s 
potential for supporting diver missions and reducing risk through 
enhanced situational awareness. 
• Acquisitions – The naval acquisitions community is interested in the 
DOTMLPF aspects of the system life cycle. 
Oceanographic, Exploration, and Research Agencies 
• Agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Association (NOAA), Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (WHOI), 
and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) are interested in all 
aspects of the exploration of extreme underwater environments. 
Product Development Team 
• The system and its subsystems and supporting systems will 
integrate the products of numerous manufacturers. Among these 
include the developers of the vehicle’s frame, sensors, supporting 
power and communications equipment, training and operating 
software, computers, monitors and other logistic equipment.  
2. Stakeholder Needs 
The purpose of this section is to identify the effective needs of the above 
stakeholders and derive from them a set of robust needs statements. Typically, 
primitive needs are refined into effective or capability needs after thorough 
stakeholder interviews and analysis by the systems engineering team. In this 
thesis, however, the effective needs are assumed, since, to the author’s 
knowledge, no request for such a system has been published; thus, there are no 
actual written primitive needs to refine. In a following section, these effective 
needs will be further transformed into specific engineering requirements. 
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a. Intelligence Agencies 
 The intelligence community is primarily concerned with the collection of 
technical intelligence on the target, as specified in the stakeholder list. The 
principal areas of concern for the intelligence community can be categorized as 
follows: 
• Secrecy: The specific process by which the collection occurs is 
generally of less importance to the analyst, but it is vital that the 
collection itself remains secret.  
• Repeatability: It is desirable for the collection process to be 
repeatable, should a similar opportunity present itself in the future. 
A proven new method of intelligence collection may also open up 
new avenues for collection in other areas.  
• Quality: Intel analysts need the quality of the information to be as 
high as possible. The quality of the intelligence collected depends 
on a number of factors, most importantly, resolution and location 
precision.  
Lessons learned from the successful outcome of the mission may allow analysts 
to better understand how to protect our own systems from a similar exploitation 
by an adversary.  
Intelligence Agencies Needs Statement: The intelligence agencies need a 
system capable of collecting high-quality technological intelligence inside sunken 
vessels while preserving secrecy, and maintaining the capability to repeat the 
mission as required. 
b. Naval Submarine Forces Community 
The submarine community is primarily concerned with the ability of the 
system to fulfill its requirements in a manner that imposes limited cost to the 
community’s ability to conduct its primary mission: anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW), or land attack. The principal concern of the submarine commander is the 
safety of his submarine and crew. Should the commander be tasked with this 
auxiliary mission, his concern will lie chiefly with his ability to ensure the safety of 
the platform while executing the assignment as efficiently and effectively as 
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possible. As the ability to ensure platform safety, as well as mission success, 
hinges greatly on the ability of the submarine to remain undetected, it is 
reasonable to assume that the submarine should conduct the operation 
submerged. The associated needs can be categorized as follows: 
• Interoperability: The system and its support systems should be 
fully interoperable with the shipboard storage capacity, power 
supply, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) requirements, heating and 
cooling requirements, and acoustic stealth requirements.  
• Physical space: Given the extremely restricted space of a 
submarine, the system and its support systems should require as 
little physical space onboard the submarine as possible. 
• Manpower and training: The system, and the support systems, 
should require as few operators and as little training as possible. 
• Mission impact: The system should create the smallest possible 
impact on existing platform missions. 
• Risk: The system should produce the least increase in risk possible 
to the platform, its crew, and the mission. The mission should be 
executed while the submarine is submerged. The launch and 
recovery of the vehicle should be conducted in a manner that 
prevents the potential for flooding submarine spaces or fouling the 
boat’s propulsion system. The system and its support should 
contain minimal hazardous or flammable materials.  
Naval Submarine Forces Community Needs Statement: The naval submarine 
community needs a system capable of conducting the assigned mission, with 
minimal impact to the primary platform missions and safety, while possessing 
complete interoperability with host submarine systems, and requiring minimal 
storage and operating space, manpower and training, mission alteration, and 
risk. 
c. Naval EOD Community 
 The EOD community is primarily concerned with the system’s potential to 
support typical EOD missions, to include the surveillance of dangerous 
submerged spaces. As the organization responsible for the removal and disposal 
of unexploded ordinance, the EOD community, along with the navy diver 
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community, is well familiar with the use of remotely-operated and autonomous 
vehicles. In the context of this reference mission, the EOD community needs the 
system to be capable of detecting potentially hazardous materials and conditions, 
while presenting minimal hazards to the operators. The EOD community needs 
can be categorized as follows: 
• Situational Awareness (SA): If EOD divers are to be sent into the 
exploration environment itself on similar, shallower, missions, the 
operators need the system to provide maximum situational 
awareness in the operating environment. 
• Risk: Risk to the system operators should be minimized through 
maximum interoperability with the shipboard environment and use 
of minimally hazardous materials.  
Naval EOD Community Needs Statement: The EOD community needs a 
system that maximizes support for EOD missions by maximizing operator 
situational awareness through the detection and localization of hazardous 
materials and conditions while minimizing risk to operators. 
d. Navy Diver Community 
 In the context of this mission, the navy diver community’s needs are 
similar to the needs of the EOD community. Although not traditionally concerned 
with the handling of explosives, an increase in situational awareness delivered by 
the system is certainly of great use in support of traditional navy diving 
operations. The diver community is also in need of systems that enhance the 
effectiveness of activities such as salvage operations, deep-submergence 
operations, and the inspection and repair of ship and submarine hulls and 
equipment. 
Navy Diver Community Needs Statement: The navy diver community 
needs a system capable of enhancing diver operations by maximizing situational 
awareness and minimizing risk to divers. 
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e. Acquisitions Community 
 The acquisitions community needs to acquire a system that achieves the 
assigned mission with the highest performance for the lowest cost over the 
system life cycle. This need typically requires a close examination of system 
attributes, commonly referred to as the “ilities,” familiar to systems engineers.  
Acquisitions Community Needs Statement: The acquisitions 
community needs a system capable of achieving the assigned mission objective 
with maximal performance and minimal cost. 
f. Oceanographic, Exploration and Research Agencies 
 The oceanographic, exploration and research agencies need a system 
that enables the attainment of knowledge of extreme marine environments and 
the development of the necessary tools and techniques for exploring them. The 
successful accomplishment of the mission, as outlined in the DRM, could lead to 
the collection of important marine environment data. Additionally, this stakeholder 
needs to understand the effectiveness of hardware and software algorithms in 
the accomplishment of the mission, as it could aid in the development of 
alternative systems for use in other environments.  
Oceanographic, Exploration and Research Agencies Needs 
Statement: The oceanographic and exploration agencies need a system that 
enables the discovery of new environmental knowledge, new exploration 
hardware and software algorithms, and new exploration tactics, techniques, 
procedures (TTPs). 
g. Product Development Team 
 In general, the product development team needs to accomplish the 
objective as set forth by the principal stakeholder—the DIA. In doing so, it must 
design the system with concern for the complete system life cycle. Capability, 
demonstrated in the effectiveness of the system in executing the items in the 
high-level essential task list, must be maximized for minimal monetary and 
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schedule cost. Additionally, the team needs to design a system with the flexibility 
to ensure the product’s attractiveness to future customers.  
Product Development Team Needs Statement: The product 
development team needs the system to satisfy the primary objective via the high-
level essential task list while maximizing performance, flexibility, and desirability 
and minimizing cost and production time. 
The stakeholder needs are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Stakeholder Needs Summary 
Stakeholder Needs 
1. Intelligence Agencies 1.1. Operational secrecy 
1.2. Mission repeatability 
1.3. High-quality intelligence collection 
2. Naval Submarine Forces Community 2.1. Capability to execute assigned 
mission objective 
2.2. System/Host interoperability 
2.3. Minimal space requirements 
2.4. Minimal manpower and training 
requirements 
2.5. Minimal host-platform mission 
impact 
2.6. Minimal host-platform risk 
3. Naval EOD Community 3.1. Maximal SA enhancement 
3.2. Minimal risk to operators 
4. Navy Diver Community 4.1. Maximal operational support 
4.2. Minimal risk to divers 
5. Acquisitions Community 5.1. Capability to execute assigned 
mission objective 
5.2. Maximum system performance 
5.3. Minimal cost to government 
6. Oceanographic, Exploration, and 
Research Agencies 
6.1. New physical system elements for 
research 
6.2. New exploration methods 
7. Product Development Team 7.1. Capability to execute assigned 
mission objective 
7.2. Maximum system performance 
7.3. Maximum flexibility 
7.4. Maximum desirability 




The delineation of project scope aids in the generation of requirements, 
which, when fully articulated, guard against scope creep. 
1. Purpose 
The scope of the design should delineate the boundaries of the solution 
space for the stakeholder’s needs. It should define what is inside and outside the 
sphere of influence of the systems engineer. Interfaces and information flows 
should be identified. Upon the completion of this section, the capabilities that the 
systems engineer should design toward, as well as those that he should not, 
should be identified.  
The highest-level decision in the design process was completed in the 
previous chapter, upon the conclusion of the high-level analysis of alternatives. 
After considering potential forms of data retrieval from the interior of the wreck, to 
include sending human divers, using ROVs, or raising the submarine, the design 
of an AUV was decided upon as the most feasible option. Thus, it was from this 
starting point that the preliminary mission planning and the resulting high-level 
essential task list grew.  
The use of an autonomous vehicle to explore the wreck necessitates the 
research of existing systems designed for this or similar tasks. That is the 
purpose of the following section. From this analysis, the determination of 
capability gaps will provide insight into the principal areas of focus for the 
upcoming architecture synthesis. At this time, it is prudent to determine the areas 
of responsibility for the systems engineer in this project effort. 
2. Responsibilities 
The DOD acquisitions community uses the acronym DOTMLPF to 
enhance understanding of the magnitude of the effort required to undertake a 
particular project. The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel and facilities required to develop, produce, sustain, and 
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dispose of a new system during its life cycle can be roughly assigned to three 
entities—the systems engineering team, the program management team, and the 
principal stakeholders who will purchase and use the system. For this AUV 
development project, the responsibility can be delegated as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Project Division of Responsibility 
 Consideration Meaning Responsibility 
D Doctrine How will the system be employed? Systems 
Engineering 
O Organization How will the project effort be divided? Program 
Management 








L Leadership and 
Education 
Who will be in charge of the 
operation and training? 
DOD 
P Personnel Who will be assigned to the project? DOD 
 





Note that the three principal areas of concern for the systems engineering 
team, and for the purpose of this thesis, include doctrine, training, and materiel. 
How the system will be employed, how the user will train to use the system, and 
the logistics needed to support the system are directly related to system 
architecture.  
3. Context 
It is necessary to clarify the system boundary. At this point, the system 
boundary shall be defined as the operational environment, the vehicle itself, the 
supporting physical systems, the necessary logistics, and the doctrine and 
training necessary for system operation. The operational environment includes 
the host submarine, the open ocean between the host submarine and the target 
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submarine, and the interior spaces of the target submarine, as shown in the 
operational concept graphic view given in Figure 10. 
Figure 10.  Operational Concept Graphic 
 
Adapted from: Richie Kohler. 2015. “U-869 Gallery.” Accessed November. 
http://www.richiekohler.com/gallery/u-869-gallery/; Federation of American 
Scientists. 2000. “Project 685 Plavnik Mike Class.” Accessed Oct.14, 2015. 
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rus/685.htm. 
The context diagram view, shown in Figure 11, identifies the principal 
physical constituents of the operational environment and the corresponding 
interface relationships. Related interfaces are categorized by colors to augment 
conceptualization. Six of the interfaces occur through the physical support 
systems (located onboard the host submarine) and are indicated by the blue 
circle with white “S.” This physical support system includes such items as 








Figure 11.  Context Diagram 
 
4. Definitions 
The definition of the operating environment, vehicle, and support system is 
helpful in delineating system boundaries. 
• The operating environment is: The host submarine, the target 
submarine, and the open ocean between them 
• The operating environment is not: The external support facilities 
and modes of transportation to and from the host submarine 
• The vehicle is: The AUV responsible for wreck penetration and 
surveillance 
• The vehicle is not: Any delivery system, autonomous or not, that 
does not penetrate the wreck, or any umbilical cord or similar 
interface with systems external to the target submarine 
• The supporting system is: All system components carried 

































• The supporting system is not: Any physical part of the vehicle or 
training and maintenance supplies not carried onboard the host 
submarine 
5. Identification of Principal Concerns 
Continuing the exploration of the problem space, it is useful to ask, “Given 
the mission, what might a perfect vehicle look like?” By identifying the optimal 
design characteristics, the resulting list of attributes enables the architect to more 
easily understand the project’s most significant architectural challenges, as well 
as the likely areas of concern.  
Characteristics of the Perfect Vehicle 
• costs little 
• requires little training to operate 
• requires no operational impact to the host submarine 
• leaves no trace behind on the target submarine 
• has an unlimited electrical power supply 
• completes the mission rapidly 
• has unlimited processing power and speed 
• never gets lost—maintains perfect localization capability 
• makes perfect obstacle decisions 
• never silts out the environment 
• collects perfect sensor data 
• launches and recovers seamlessly with the host submarine 
This wish list likely contains few, if any, feasible items; however, from it the 





• electrical power 
• data-processing power 
• decision-making fidelity/autonomy 
• maneuverability  
• anti-silt-out propulsion 
• sensor capability 
Certainly, as the complexity and cost of the vehicle increases, so does the 
risk associated with the very real possibility of losing the vehicle inside the wreck. 
Interoperability of the vehicle with the host submarine is also a non-trivial matter. 
As the caretaker of one of the nation’s most powerful and expensive war assets, 
the submarine commander builds his career upon conservative operations and 
strict adherence to protocol. The vehicle must adhere to the resulting potentially 
stringent interoperability requirements. Electrical and processing power—both 
key concerns for obvious reasons—will be largely dependent on the key design 
decision of whether or not to incorporate the use of a tether. The use of a tether 
may spawn arduous tether-management concerns to avoid entanglement within 
the wreck. The use of a tether also greatly increases system decision-making 
capability by linking the vehicle to a human operator. Additionally, the tether may 
provide power and reduce the necessary physical space allocated to the 
vehicle’s battery. Forgoing the use of a tether will remove this particular 
entanglement concern and likely increase the vehicle’s agility; however, it will 
also introduce the problem of limited onboard data-processing capacity. Software 
development will be a major challenge, as the decision-making capacity of 
autonomous vehicles is limited, and the challenges imposed by defeating 
obstacles in the interior environment is not trivial even for human divers. 
Similarly, translation and attitude control without the disturbance of sediment and 
the implementation of sensors with the resolution necessary to accomplish the 
mission will contribute much to the challenges of the engineering team. 
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6. System Objectives 
Now that an understanding of the responsibilities, context and principal 
design concerns for the mission has been established, a list of desired 
capabilities, or objectives, that the architects can design to should be developed. 
This preliminary list is not comprehensive, but rather, the best starting point for 
the iterations to follow.  
System Objectives 
• interoperability with the host sub in all required mission phases 
• ability to transit to (or be transported to) the target submarine 
• ability to transit the interior spaces of the target submarine  
• ability to map and record the interior spaces 
• ability to identify small physical targets of opportunity 
• ability to determine how, or whether to attempt to, collect a target of 
opportunity 
• ability to conduct a comprehensive search 
• ability to determine how, or whether to attempt to, overcome an 
obstacle 
Similarly, it is important to identify some capabilities that, although 
inherently good, are outside the scope of the stakeholder’s effective needs and, 
therefore, not desirable to expend design effort upon. Avoiding designing for 
these capabilities, which are listed below, and other, similar distractions, is key to 
preventing scope creep, regardless of how technologically interesting the results 
might be. 
System Capabilities outside the Scope of the Effort 
• ability to transit long-distance open water space  
• ability to defeat heavy obstacles 
• ability to collect large artifacts 
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The ability to transit long distances in open water, i.e., much longer than the 
required distance between the host submarine and target wreck, may increase 
flexibility, but would require significantly greater power capacity or tether lengths. 
Similarly, the ability to defeat heavy obstacles, such as the ability to breach a 
hull, or collect large artifacts, would likely require excessive size or power 
capacity for the primary mission of interior exploration.  
D. AUV EXPLORATION AND MAPPING SYSTEMS LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, the architectures of four key AUVs will be examined. 
1. Introduction 
The four AUVs discussed in this section were chosen because their 
designs are the closest in existence to achieving a shipwreck-penetration 
capability. Their architectures vary widely, as do their costs and capabilities. To 
the author’s knowledge, these few systems are the most relevant AUVs currently 
in existence.  AUV technology is, after all, relatively new. Through a thorough 
examination of the available literature regarding these systems, their successes, 
and their shortcomings, a better understanding of the capability gaps, and their 
corresponding requirements, can be attained.  
2. DEPTHX 
The Deep Phreatic Thermal Explorer (DEPTHX) autonomous underwater 
vehicle, created by Stone Aerospace, has been used to map the Zacaton 
underwater sinkhole (cenote) in Tamaulipas, Mexico (Stone Aerospace 2010).  
a. Vehicle Description 
DEPTHX is one of two generations of AUVs developed by Stone 
Aerospace. DEPTHX was designed to explore extreme environments such as 
the deep hydrothermal vents and sub-glacial lakes in Antarctica (Stone 
Aerospace 2010). The vehicle was designed to explore these areas for the first 
time—thereby testing the ability of a fully autonomous system to explore and 
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map true 3D environments where no previous maps have been developed or 
navigation aids deployed (Stone Aerospace 2010). According to Stone 
Aerospace, the vehicle was developed as part of a NASA effort toward a mission 
to explore a sub-surface ocean on Europa. Additionally, the company claims the 
vehicle achieved three remarkable accomplishments, including being the first 
mobile robot to implement 3D-SLAM, the first AUV to explore a subterranean 
cavern and produce a map of it, and the first robot to decide, autonomously, 
when, where, and how to collect specimens (Stone Aerospace 2010). The fully-
assembled vehicle is shown in Figure 12. 
Figure 12.  DEPTHX 
 
Source: Stone Aerospace. 2010. “DEPTHX (DEep Phreatic THermal eXplorer).” 
Accessed Oct. 19, 2015. http://www.stoneaerospace.com/products-pages 
/products-DEPTHX.php. 
The vehicle’s axisymmetric, ellipsoid shape is ideally suited to SLAM and 
prevents snagging on objects (Stone Aerospace 2010). The vehicle’s major axis 
is 2 m., its minor axis is 1.5 m., and its total weight is 1.35 metric tonnes (Stone 
Aerospace 2010). The vehicle’s center of mass is significantly separated from the 
center of buoyancy, permitting resistance to pitch and roll and allowing the 
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vehicle to be modeled as a 4 DOF, uncoupled system (Stone Aerospace 2010). 
The internal component architecture is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13.  DEPTHX Internal Architecture 
 
Source: Stone Aerospace. 2010. “DEPTHX (DEep Phreatic THermal eXplorer).” 
Accessed Oct. 19, 2015. http://www.stoneaerospace.com/products-pages 
/products-DEPTHX.php. 
The vehicle is designed for precise movements in the X,Y,Z, and yaw 
degrees of freedom (Stone Aerospace 2010). Yaw and pitch are intentionally 
damped for instrument-position stability. The vehicle uses two independent 
systems for navigation—the dead-reckoning sensor suite and 3D SLAM sensors 
(Stone Aerospace 2010). The DEPTHX dead-reckoning sensor suite includes the 
Honeywell HG2001 inertial measurement unit (IMU), an RDI Navigator 600 
Doppler velocity log (DVL), two Paro-scientific Digiquartz depth sensors, and a 
conductivity, temperature, and depth (CTD) sensor (Fairfield et al. 2007). The 
CTD sensor measures the local speed of sound in order to correct DVL velocity 
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measurements. The quality of the dead-reckoning solution can be very good 
(0.5% of distance traveled), however, over the course of a multi-hour mission, the 
error will increase to unacceptable levels in operations in tunnel systems 
(Fairfield et al. 2007). According to Fairfield et al., the dead-reckoning sensors 
provide excellent measurements in pitch, roll, yaw, and depth (z). Only the x and 
y coordinates remain highly dependent on the SLAM methodology, which is 
discussed in the next section (Fairfield et al. 2007). 
The DEPTHX pencil-beam sonar array produces a constellation of ranges 
surrounding the vehicle (Fairfield et al. 2007). A total of 54 sonar sensors are 
used in three separate great circles around the vehicle. Design of the sonar 
beams in a circle around the vehicle is very important for the SLAM methodology 
because, unlike cylinder arrays, circular arrays allow the sensors to observe 
features the vehicle has already mapped (Fairfield et al. 2007). Fairfield et al. 
note that the inability to observe previously-mapped features causes additive 
error in SLAM. Feature detection is difficult, nonetheless, because the array does 
not have the point density, resolution, or update rate of a laser scanner (Fairfield 
et al. 2007). Despite the difficulties, DEPTHX demonstrates a SLAM accuracy of 
approximately one meter within a 500 m. cube (Stone Aerospace 2010). A 
depiction of the sonar coverage of the DEPTHX arrays is given in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14.  Acoustic View of the DEPTHX Arrays 
 
Source: Stone Aerospace. 2010. “DEPTHX (DEep Phreatic THermal eXplorer).” 
Accessed Oct.19, 2015. http://www.stoneaerospace.com/products-pages 
/products-DEPTHX.php. 
Processing power was limited, at the time of the Fairfield et al. 2007 
article, to 1 Gb of RAM and 1.8 GHz processor speed (Pentium M). The SLAM 
update rate is limited to the sonar array cycle time of 1 Hz. Fairfield et al. state 
that sensor degradation or failure is coped with by continuing in a localization-
only mode that does not update maps, or by adjusting the particle count to 
maximize the number of particles. The Rao-Blackwellized particle filter is 
combined with evidence grids for map representation (Fairfield et al. 2007). 
b. Methodologies 
Dead Reckoning: Fairfield et al. state that inertial, depth, and Doppler-
velocity sensors are typically used by AUVs for the task of dead-reckoning 
navigation. According to the authors, most navigation systems for underwater 
vehicles also incorporate Kalman Filters (Fairfield et al. 2007). These filters 
combine the inertial measurements with Doppler velocity. While operating with 
access to the surface, GPS updates are typically used to reduce drift error. 
According to Fairfield et al., Long Baseline (LBL), beacon-based positioning 
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systems can also serve this task. In the exploration of restricted, 3D 
environments such as caves or wrecks, however, LBL or GPS navigational 
assistance is unavailable, thus, other methods are necessary.  
SLAM Methodology: Simultaneous Localization And Mapping (SLAM) is 
a key methodology for the use of autonomous vehicles to localize and map areas 
for exploration (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006). Using SLAM, an autonomous 
vehicle can generate a map of its environment and simultaneously deduce its 
location from that map. Both the vehicle trajectory and the landmark locations are 
estimated without any prior knowledge of the location. Since neither the vehicle 
nor landmark locations are precisely known, a probabilistic approach is used in 
the methodology (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006). Error between the true and 
estimated landmark positions is common and due to sensor error, which is 
particularly problematic under water, and the uncertainty of vehicle location at the 
time of the landmark observation. Thus, the landmark localization errors are 
highly correlated. The correlations between estimates of landmark positions 
increase monotonically with increasing observations. According to Durrant-Whyte 
et al., this is a critical revelation; understanding of the relative position of 
landmarks continually improves, no matter the path of the vehicle. The SLAM 
problem has several solutions, which are described in the following paragraphs. 
These solutions provide a representation of the observation model as well as the 
motion model in order to allow efficient computation of time and measurement 
updates (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006).  
EKF SLAM: The most common solution is the Extended Kalman Filter 
(EKF), which uses a linearized state-space model and incorporates Gaussian 
noise (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006). EKF SLAM is very well known, as 
extended Kalman filters have been commonly used in other navigation and 
tracking problems. However, according to Durrant-Whyte et al., it has several 
drawbacks, including: 
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• Convergence. Initial vehicle position and observation uncertainties 
determine a lower bound toward which individual landmark position 
variances converge. 
• Computational Effort. The joint-covariance matrix and all 
landmarks must be updated upon each observation, leading to a 
quadratic computational growth with the quantity of landmarks.  
• Data Association. When the vehicle returns and re-observes 
landmarks after traveling a long distance, EKF SLAM is vulnerable 
to incorrect association of landmarks to observations. This is 
especially true in environments where complex landmarks look 
different when viewed from different directions.  
• Nonlinearity. Inconsistent solutions can be generated when using 
a linearized model of nonlinear observation and motion models. 
FastSLAM: An important alternative to EKF SLAM is the Rao-
Blackwellized particle filter, also known as FastSLAM (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 
2006). This method describes the vehicle’s motion model as a collection of 
samples of more general non-Gaussian distributions. According to Durrant-
Whyte et al., FastSLAM is a fundamental design shift for recursive probabilistic 
SLAM. This method is based on Monte Carlo sampling, also known as particle 
filtering. Maps produced via FastSLAM represent a collection of independent 
Gaussian distributions, with linear complexity (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006). 
This key property is the reason for its speed. Nevertheless, FastSLAM suffers 
degeneration caused by an inability to forget past measurements. FastSLAM 
empirical results, in actual outdoor environments, demonstrate accurate map-
making capability in practice (Durrant-Whyte and Bailey 2006).  
Marine SLAM: Fairfield et al. describe their use of SLAM to bound 
inherent dead reckoning error and allow the use of a completely self-contained 
vehicle to map an underwater environment (Fairfield et al. 2006).  The resolution 
needed to recognize features is difficult to achieve in underwater sensors. 
According to Fairfield et al., a number of strategies for implementing underwater 
SLAM have been developed, including: 
• Use of tunnel cross-section (slide) images derived from sonar. This 
method works as long as the environment is tunnel-shaped. 
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Scanning sonars are effective where free-floating artificial features 
exist. 
• Video mosaicing, along with combined sonar and vision-based 
feature detection works well in well-lit, clear water.  
• Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) has been used in a range-and-
bearing variant of SLAM effective for large, monotonous regions of 
water.  
A 3D SLAM map of the first 200 m. of the Zacaton cenote generated from 
the DEPTHX sonar sensors is shown in Figure 15. 
Figure 15.  3D SLAM Map of the of the Zacaton Cenote  
 
Source: Fairfield, Nathaniel, George Kantor, and David Wettergreen. 2006. 
“Towards Particle Filter SLAM with Three Dimensional Evidence Grids in a 
Flooded Subterranean Environment.” In Proceedings 2006 IEEE International 
Conference on Robotics and Automation, 2006, 3575–3580. 
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SLAM vehicle position error was shown by Fairfield et al. to be a 
significant improvement over simple dead reckoning. Fairfield et al. note that it is 
also important that the position error is bounded, unlike dead reckoning error, 
which, predictably, continues to grow with time. Handling the large quantities of 
data needed to generate high-resolution maps of 3D environments, and the 
necessary performance of underwater sensors to achieve that performance, is a 
significant concern (Fairfield et al. 2006). A solution to the organization of data is 
discussed in the next section. 
3D Evidence Grids and Octree Data Storage: An evidence grid (also 
called an occupancy grid) is a world-view representation in which space is 
divided into cubic volume elements called voxels (Fairfield et al. 2007). Fairfield 
et al. explain that the voxels, which contain occupancy evidence generated from 
the vehicle’s sensors, are arranged in a grid. Because of the increased number 
of storage cells, upgrading a 2D evidence grid to a 3D grid is data intensive. 
Independence is assumed between neighboring voxels and individual sonar 
measurements. The independence assumption is necessary to prevent the 
evidence grid from becoming intractable, but the cost is noisy maps in response 
to measurement ambiguity (Fairfield et al. 2007).  
The magnitude of the data required to update 3D occupancy maps, 
especially at the rates needed for near real-time SLAM, require a data structure 
more efficient than the uniform array (Fairfield et al. 2007). An octree is such a 
solution. In an octree, the environment is divided into eight cubes. Each cube can 
be further broken into eight more sub-cubes and so on until the finest resolution 




Figure 16.  Octree Data Structure 
 
Source: Fairfield, Nathaniel, George Kantor, and David Wettergreen. 2007. 
“Real-time SLAM with Octree Evidence Grids for Exploration in Underwater 
Tunnels.” Journal of Field Robotics 24, no. 1 (2007): 3–22. 
Octree data storage significantly reduces the large data-capacity 
requirements of 3D SLAM since any given environment contains a great deal of 
homogenous space. Any large homogenous portion of space can be represented by 
one octnode, thus truncating children octnodes of the same value (Fairfield et al. 
2007).  
3. HAUV 
According to Vaganay et al., the Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
(HAUV) project began in 2002 as a joint effort of the Bluefin Robotics Corporation 
(Bluefin) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sea Grant AUV Laboratory 
(MIT-SG) under the funding of the Office of Naval Research (ONR).  
a. Vehicle Description 
The purpose of the first prototype, which incorporated Dual Frequency 
Identification Sonar (DIDSON) as its primary search sensor, was to autonomously 
conduct searches of naval ship hulls using a hull-relative navigation methodology 
and identify potential threats such as mines and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) (Vaganay et al.). HAUV-1A and HAUV-1B were the result of this effort, 
participating in demonstrations from 2006–2009. Direction from the U.S. Navy’s 
PMS-408 office, via the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Hull Unmanned Underwater 
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Vehicle Localization System (EOD HULS) program, resulted in the 2008 delivery 
of HAUV-2, which incorporated a dual-axis sensor rotation capability. Vaganay et 
al. state that further refinement in speed capability, weight reduction, and the ability 
to direct the sonar to either starboard or port, led to a dramatic form change and 
the birth of HAUV-3, shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17.  HAUV-3 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vegas, Aug. 6-9, 2012 
The vehicle was designed to be launched from a small boat, such as a 
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) or Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) 
(Vaganay et al.). The operator team consists of three crewmembers; the vehicle 
operator, the coxswain, and the tender, as shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  HAUV Small Boat Operations 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vegas, Aug. 6-9, 2012 
The HAUV-3 hull-inspection system incorporates the vehicle and a battery 
charger, battery discharger, CRRC box, operator laptop, fiber optic tether and 
reel, vehicle re-locator, Removable Data Storage Module (RDSM) and battery, 
with each item duplicated for redundancy, as shown in Figure 19. 
Figure 19.  HAUV and Support System Components 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vega, Aug. 6-9, 2012. 
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The CRRC box powers the fiber-optic reel, which allows for Ethernet 
connectivity through the fiber-optic cable. The RDSM is removed from the vehicle 
after recovery to download data. Battery run time is greater than 3.5 hours, and a 
spare is typically included in the kit for extended operations (Vaganay et al.). The 
vehicle’s components are shown in Figure 20. 
Figure 20.  HAUV Vehicle Components 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vegas, Aug. 6-9, 2012. 
Each component is mounted within an aluminum frame, which includes 
grip points and skids for ease of launch and recovery (Vaganay et al.). Control of 
all degrees-of-freedom in movement—except roll, which is hydrostatically 
stable—is provided through the vehicle’s six thrusters. Seven pieces of foam 
provide buoyancy. Upper and lower fairings protect the vehicle’s battery and 
main electronics housing. Two rotary actuators control the movement of the 
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payload tray, which is supported in front of the vehicle with two arms (Vaganay et 
al.). Vaganay et al. state that the vehicle will right itself if flipped over in the water 
since the upper-mounted main electronics housing is light and the lower-mounted 
battery compartment is heavy compared to the other components mounted near 
the vehicle’s midline. The battery and main electronics housing can be switched, 
however, allowing operations of the vehicle in an upside-down position. Allowing 
the vehicle to operate in either orientation is advantageous since it allows the 
DIDSON sonar to be located on the right or left side of the vehicle as necessary 
in order to always be aimed at the hull ahead of the path of the vehicle as it 
scans (Vaganay et al.).  
b. Methodology 
The ship hull can be divided into two regimes—complex and non-complex 
areas (Vaganay et al.). Non-complex areas consist of flat, simple hull sections 
such as the ship’s sides and bottom. Complex areas consist of high-curvature 
and protuberance-laden areas such as propellers, rudders, and sonar domes.  
According to Vaganay et al., the HAUV uses a hull-relative, Doppler Velocity Log 
(DVL) method for navigation and control when mapping non-complex search 
areas. This method allows for high-resolution sonar imaging without the need to 
deploy external navigation beacons or other external navigation aids (Vaganay et 
al.). By automatically maintaining the DVL sensor orientation normal to the ship’s 
hull and maintaining a constant stand-off distance, the AUV’s position can be 
determined by integrating the hull-relative velocity. The imaging sonar is 
automatically pointed at an optimal grazing angle with the hull (Vaganay et al.). 
The AUV automatically executes surveys, forming slice images, from stern to 
bow or vice versa, as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21.  HAUV Layered Survey 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vegas, Aug. 6-9, 2012. 
Vaganay et al. state that the sonar images are transmitted via a fiber optic 
tether to provide the operator with real-time data. If the operator is suspect of a 
particular area, autonomous operations can be suspended and the vehicle 
manually controlled (Vaganay et al.). When manual control is activated, the 
vehicle will hold its position relative to the hull and then allow the operator to 
move the vehicle up and down or right and left while the vehicle maintains an 
automatic, safe-standoff distance from the hull. If desired, the operator may 
override the standoff distance to drive the vehicle closer to the point of interest 
and employ the use of a low-light camera. Should the object need to be 
neutralized, the vehicle can hold position while a diver descends along the tether 
line to the object. The vehicle can be commanded to resume automatic mapping 
at any time (Vaganay et al.).  
According to Vaganay et al., the complex areas remain an area of concern 
for HAUV developers. This is an area of ongoing research by Bluefin and ONR’s 
Confined Area Search Group (Vaganay et al.). In complex environments, HAUV-
3 points the DVL at the seafloor, allowing the vehicle to navigate relative to it, 
since complex areas do not allow a reliable DVL lock. The Dual Frequency 
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Identification Sonar (DIDSON) used by HAUV-3 can also be set to profiling mode 
instead of imaging mode (Vaganay et al.). In profiling mode, a special lens 
focuses the vertical aperture to 1 degree instead of 14 degrees, resulting in the 
generation of a 30-degrees by 1-degree plane of 96 beams. The vehicle moves 
relative to the structure while operating DIDSON, and the sonar profiles are 
stacked in a reference frame created from the vehicle’s navigation data (Vaganay 
et al.). An example of 3D reconstruction of a complex area on a ship is shown in 
Figure 22. 
Figure 22.  3D DIDSON Profile Reconstruction 
 
Source: Vaganay, Jerome, Kyle Guilbert, Leo Gurfinkel, Kimberly Shurn, Larry 
Simpson, and Mike Szegedi. “Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle: A Hull 
Search System in Procurement in the U.S. Navy,” presented at AUVSI 
Unmanned Systems North America Conference, Las Vegas, Aug. 6-9, 2012 
The principal disadvantage of the 3D reconstruction is the inherent lack of detail, 
and corresponding inability to detect small targets, due to data filtering and 
smoothing (Vaganay et al.).   
Vaganay et al. state that another application considered for the vehicle is 
the inspection of water-conveyance tunnels. Currently, ROVs carry out this task, 
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but they require continuous piloting by the operator and are less capable of 
assuring complete coverage (Vaganay et al.). The HAUV could conduct this 
mission with a modification of the DIDSON mount, allowing for 360-degree 
rotation in the pitch and roll axis. The vehicle would then be capable of holding its 
position in the tunnel center using its DVL, while scanning the tunnel walls via the 
rotation of the DIDSON sensor (Vaganay et al.). The HAUV would travel forward 
through the tunnel repeating the DIDSON scan at intervals less than the sensor’s 
field of view, thus ensuring complete wall coverage. A live-scan feed would be 
provided to the operator during the mission, and, upon discovering an item of 
interest, the operator may command the vehicle to close on the contact to 
capture video data, then resume the scan when complete (Vaganay et al.).  
4. ARROWS 
The Archaeological Robot Systems for the World’s Seas (ARROWS) 
project began in September of 2012 under the coordination of the Universita di 
Firenze, Italy (Allotta et al. 2015). The project objective was the development of a 
cooperative, heterogeneous team of AUVs for the execution of a complete, 
autonomous archaeological mission.  
The framework incorporates three new AUVs—Marine Tool for 
Archaeology (MARTA), A_Size AUV, and U-CAT (Allotta et al. 2015). These 
vehicles were developed upon the needs of archaeologists. The ARROWS team 
was challenged with the task of adapting existing offshore gas-oil industry and 
military security industry technologies toward low-cost AUV solutions for 
archaeological problems in various sea environments. A number of technologies, 
including multi-beam echo-sounder and side-scan sonar, were incorporated in 
the design to provide necessary flexibility under various visibility conditions 
(Allotta et al. 2015). The needs of the archeological community also drove the 
requirement for precision mapping, with positional errors less than a meter. The 
various capabilities were distributed on different vehicles, resulting in a 
cooperative, heterogeneous network of vehicles. Modularity was a key design 
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principle (Allotta et al. 2015). Most interestingly, one of the requirements for 
ARROWS is the capability to penetrate shipwrecks, which was achieved, in part, 
by the U-CAT vehicle described below. This capability was deemed important to 
the archaeological community in order to help identify wrecks and determine the 
cause of their sinking (Allotta et al. 2015). At the time of this writing, a full report 
on the results of the integration of the ARROWS vehicles and the success of the 
overall mission has not been released. Full trials were scheduled for early 2015 
(Allotta et al. 2015). The following paragraphs detail the individual ARROWS 
vehicles. 
MARTA, developed at the University of Florence, is a modular AUV, 
allowing for customizable configurations for various archaeological environments 
(Allotta et al. 2015). The largest of the three vehicles, with a length of 
approximately 3 meters, diameter of 7 inches, and a weight of approximately 
90kg, MARTA is still capable of being launched over the side of a small boat 
(Allotta et al. 2015). Five degrees of freedom (minus roll) are controlled through 
six thrusters—two rear, two lateral, and two vertical. In order to move near the 
seabed without disturbing silt, the vehicle can also control pitch and vertical 
translation via two buoyancy modules on the bow and stern (Allotta et al. 2015).  
According to Allotta et al., MARTA, shown in Figure 23, has a max depth of 150 
m., max autonomous time of four hours, and hovering capability.  
Figure 23.  MARTA 
 
Source: Allotta, Benedetto, Riccardo Costanzi, Alessandro Ridolfi, Carlo 
Colombo, Fabio Bellavia, Marco Fanfani, Fabio Pazzaglia et al. 2015. “The 
ARROWS Project: Adapting and Developing Robotics Technologies for 
Underwater Archaeology.” IFAC-PapersOnLine 48, no. 2: 194–199. 
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MARTA modules include two buoyancy control modules, as previously 
mentioned, two ODROID-XU main computers, two acoustic modems, one 
SensorTechnics depth sensor, one Xsens MTi-G-700 GPS/IMU, one KVH 1-axis 
DSP-1750 Fiber Optic Gyro (FOG), one NavQuest 600 Micro Doppler Velocity 
Log (DVL), one RF Solutions radio modem, six MaxAmps LiPo batteries, one 
magnetic activation switch, NESNE motor drivers, and mission-specific 
equipment (Allotta et al. 2015). Mission-specific sensors include a Teledyne 
BlueView M900 2D forward-looking sonar, mounted on the nose, or an Ocean 
Tools C-laser Fan, four illuminators, and two Basler Ace cameras (Allotta et al. 
2015).  
A_Size AUV is essentially similar to MARTA, with an emphasis on minimal 
size (Allotta et al. 2015). According to Allotta et al., the vehicle, shown in Figure 
24, capitalizes on the ARROWS network, which schedules tasks to platforms and 
manages those platforms in real-time through integrated control software, 
allowing the vehicles to cooperate and maximize individual vehicle capabilities. 
Figure 24.  A_Size AUV 
 
Source: Allotta, Benedetto, Riccardo Costanzi, Alessandro Ridolfi, Carlo 
Colombo, Fabio Bellavia, Marco Fanfani, Fabio Pazzaglia et al. 2015. “The 
ARROWS project: adapting and developing robotics technologies for underwater 
archaeology.” IFAC-PapersOnLine 48, no. 2: 194–199. 
U-CAT is an experimental biomimetic AUV designed with the ultimate goal 
of shipwreck penetration for data collection (Allotta et al. 2015). Penetration of 
shipwrecks is typically a dangerous task, performable only by technical divers. As 
an experimental platform, a principal objective was low-cost design (Allotta et al. 
2015). The key benefit of a low-cost, experimental, shipwreck-penetration 
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autonomous vehicle is the reduction of the financial risk from loss of the vehicle. 
U-CAT does not operate with DVL, imaging sonars, or other expensive sensors 
(Allotta et al. 2015). The developers state that the use of fully autonomous 
navigation inside a shipwreck is “far beyond the state of the art, especially when 
using low cost sensing solutions.” (Allotta et al. 2015, p. 197). Salumae et al. 
state that AUV technologies are often unsuitable for real-world applications 
outside of the heavily-funded oil and defense industries. This is due to a lack of 
available funding for activities such as archaeology as well as the general 
immaturity of the technology (Salumae et al. 2014). Typically, archaeologists 
employ ROVs or divers for detailed inspection of shipwrecks—a risky endeavor 
for humans, and a very limited task for ROVs due to the risk of tether 
entanglement (Salumae et al. 2014). According to Allotta et al., this 
understanding drives the conservative employment of U-CAT in relatively-simple 
scenarios, such as being hand-delivered into a room in a shipwreck by a diver, 
allowing U-CAT to record the room, followed by a return to the diver via a beacon 
carried by the diver. These scenarios will allow the developers to identify 
promising techniques and technologies for use in more complex scenarios, such 
as shipwreck interior mapping, at a later date (Allotta et al. 2015). The U-CAT 
vehicle is depicted in Figure 25. 
Figure 25.  U-CAT (First Prototype) 
 
Source: Salumae, Taavi, Rasmus Raag, Jaan Rebane, Andres Ernits, Gert 
Toming, Mart Ratas, and Maarja Kruusmaa. 2014. “Design principle of a 
biomimetic underwater robot U-CAT.” Oceans-St. John’s, pp. 1–5. 
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The needs of archaeologists operating in two areas—the Mediterranean 
and Baltic Sea—were analyzed (Salumae et al. 2014). These areas were chosen 
due to their very different sea conditions in order to demonstrate the vehicle’s 
usability. The Mediterranean Sea has generally higher visibility, salinity, depths, 
and temperature. The Baltic Sea typically has lower depths, visibility, and large 
temperature gradients (Salumae et al. 2014). The stakeholder-needs analysis 
resulted in a set of general requirements for U-CAT, listed below (Salumae et al. 
2014): 
• Recording video of shipwreck interiors to assess general wreck 
conditions and identify interesting objects is the main task. 
• The vehicle should be as maneuverable and small as possible, with 
low entanglement risk, in order to penetrate confined spaces. 
• The vehicle must be untethered when operating inside the wreck, 
but include an ROV mode for tethered flight to a specific point, such 
as a wreck entrance hole. 
• The vehicle must be affordable to archaeologists to enable the 
potential use of multiple vehicles with an acceptability of loss of a 
vehicle.  
• The vehicle must be simple enough to operate without special 
robotics training and suitably ergonomic for deployment from a 
small boat with limited crew. 
• The vehicle must be capable of operating at depths of at least 100 
m. 
• The vehicle must be capable of speeds of at least a meter per 
second in order to cope with currents. 
• The vehicle must be capable of at least two hours of operation time. 
The resulting vehicle weighs 17 kg and has a 100 m. maximum depth 
(Allotta et al. 2015). The biomimetic fins are perhaps the vehicle’s most 
distinctive feature. The highly-maneuverable vehicle uses four oscillating flippers, 
placed to provide control over all 6 degrees of freedom (Allotta et al. 2015). 
Allotta et al. postulate that inside a wreck, flippers are advantageous to propellers 
because they are less likely to disturb sediment or become entangled. To the 
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author’s knowledge, this claim has not been experimentally verified. The four fins 
are angled inward so that the fin’s thrust vectors are not collinear (Salumae et al. 
2014). Allowing each fin to oscillate independently around one axis, in any 
direction, is what allows the vehicle to achieve 6 degrees of freedom (Salumae et 
al. 2014). A principal disadvantage to fins, however, is the difficulty in achieving 
the steady motion necessary for most sensors. The ARROWS team is working to 
limit the U-CAT oscillations to only one degree of freedom (Allotta et al. 2015).  
U-CAT’s architecture includes two AMT buoyancy compensators. These 
compensators change the vehicle’s volume through the movement of two 
pistons. Maintaining neutral buoyancy by movement of the pistons in response to 
changes in temperature and salinity can save a lot of energy (Salumae et al. 
2014). Although pitch and roll is limited in the vehicle by designing the center of 
buoyancy above the center of mass, moving the pistons independently can 
change the center of buoyancy position fore or aft (Salumae et al. 2014). U-CAT 
also contains a beacon-localization system to allow navigation to homing 
beacons mounted on the wreck’s exterior by a diver (Allotta et al. 2015). 
Additionally, U-CAT carries 8 obstacle-avoidance echo-sounders, an IMU, an 
Applicon acoustic modem, a depth sensor, illuminators, a camera, a computer 
(with a 1 GHz Quad-Core ARM cortex A9 processor), brushless, 60 W DC 
motors, NESNE Electronics motor drivers, and a 540 Wh battery allowing for an 
operating time of at least 4 hours (Allotta et al. 2015).  
Salumae et al. state that the principal problem with conventional AUV 
exploration of shipwrecks is the size and expense of the vehicle. Penetration of 
the wreck simply generates too much risk for the owner of an expensive AUV to 
accept (Salumae et al. 2014). Salumae et al. also consider the size of typical 
AUVs to be too large for effective wreck exploration. These are the concerns that 
led to the development of the small, simple, inexpensive U-CAT (no explicit cost, 
however, was given).  
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5. ACQUAS 
The Agile Close-Quarters Underwater Autonomous System (ACQUAS) is 
a hover-capable autonomous underwater vehicle research platform developed at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for Autonomous Vehicle Research 
(CAVR) in Monterey, California.  
a. Vehicle Description 
ACQUAS was developed specifically for the purpose of enabling 
autonomous operations in close quarters with other objects, the seafloor, or 
human divers—a realm traditionally relegated to ROVs or divers (Du Toit 2015). 
According to Du Toit, since close-quarters operations (CQO) represent new 
territory for the AUV realm, a unique set of requirements is necessary. ACQUAS 
is a tethered vehicle, which is very beneficial for platform testing, but presents 
challenges for CQO operations (Du Toit 2015). The vehicle, shown in Figure 26, 
is a modified SeaBotix vLBV300 miniature ROV platform. 
Figure 26.  ACQUAS 
 
Source: Du Toit, Noel E. 2015. “The Agile Close-Quarters Underwater 
Autonomous System, ACQUAS.” Naval Postgraduate School (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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ACQUAS is depth-rated to 300 m. and is controllable via an operator 
control unit, communicating through a fiber-optic cable (Du Toit 2015). The 
complete system consists of a surface power supply, tether, vehicle, and the 
operator control unit. Sensor data is transmitted to the operator through ethernet-
based communication protocols. Du Toit further explains that the open-frame 
platform design allows for easily swapping sensors. The vehicle can be 
transported with two people and operated from confined spaces such as small 
boats or docks. ACQUAS has four degrees of freedom, provided through two 
vertical thrusters and four statically vectored horizontal thrusters. The 
approximate vehicle dimensions are 24 in. x 15 in. x 15 in., with a mass of 18.1 
kg (38.1 kg with sensors) in air (Du Toit 2015). The vehicle’s maneuverability and 
size are particularly suitable for CQO. The vehicle’s adjustable camera and 
lighting system feeds high-definition video in real time to the operator station. The 
vehicle also employs a simple grasper for basic tasks (Du Toit 2015).  
b. Methodology 
To execute its autonomous missions, ACQUAS must both localize and 
map its environment. According to Du Toit, the localization capability for 
autonomous control is provided through a number of sensors. A Greensea 
Systems Fiber-Optic Gyro (FOG) based INS is integrated with a GPS and DVL to 
provide seafloor-relative velocity information. The FOG based INS is an Ethernet-
capable system that combines gyro, accelerometer, and magnetic compass 
information. The required localization augmentation for the relative INS solution 
may be provided by GPS or an acoustic beacon system (Du Toit 2015). Du Toit 
further explains that although such a beacon system can provide geo-rectified 
location fixes, the system must be set up ahead of time. DVL, however, is a 
localization augmentation option that typically provides higher-accuracy tracking 
in the short term. In addition to precise localization, CQO require that the system 
operate in complicated, 3D environments (Du Toit 2015). Forward-looking 
imaging sonars, which can look ahead of the vehicle, even in turbid water, help 
address this issue. ACQUAS uses two BlueView P900 imaging sonars—one 
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vertically mounted and one horizontally mounted—to provide mapping 
information (Du Toit 2015). Additionally, the vehicle uses a high-frequency, 
micro-bathymetric sonar (MB2250), mounted sideways, for profiling. The high-
resolution data provided can then be used to develop 3D maps of the 
environment (Du Toit 2015).  
E. CAPABILITY GAP 
Examination of the capabilities of the DEPTHX, HAUV, U-CAT, and 
ACQUAS vehicles reveals a technological growth that is as exciting as it is 
promising. The rapid progress of 3D-SLAM and DVL navigation technology, in 
combination with increasingly capable sensors and vehicle-control technology, is 
rapidly closing the gap between the existing and needed capability to effectively 
explore shipwreck interiors. Although the architectural requirements have not yet 
been analyzed, it is possible and useful to identify some of the key 
disadvantages of each system at this stage in order to better understand some of 
the challenges that must be the overcome during the design solution. The 
primary advantages and disadvantages of the AUVs, relative to shipwreck- 
penetration missions, are listed in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
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Table 3.   DEPTHX Shipwreck Penetration-Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages 







mapping capability via 
3D-SLAM 
Very large – 2 m. x 1.5 
m. ellipsoid 
Low-snag, axisymmetric 
ellipsoid shape  
Very heavy – 1.35 
metric tonnes 
Two independent 
navigation systems – DR 
and SLAM 
No real-time data 
transmission 
Robust sensor suite – 




due to inability to 
forget past 
measurements 
4 DOF – X,Y,Z,Yaw No silt-out reduction 
design effort 
 
Table 4.   HAUV Shipwreck Penetration-Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages 





















sonar axis must 
remain approximately 
normal to ship’s hull 
Launchable from 
confined spaces, such 
as a small boat 
3D target 
reconstruction lacks 
detail due to 
smoothing 
5 DOF - (minus roll) Complex areas do not 




No silt-out reduction 
design effort 
Manual control capable  
 
 76 
Table 5.   U-CAT Shipwreck Penetration-Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages 










Little sensory capability – 
video data collection only 
Relatively low cost Beacon-dependent 
navigation 
Highly maneuverable 
– 6 DOF (Holonomic) 
Unsteady movements 
due to fin propulsion 




Small vehicle size 




Fins minimize silt-out 
and snagging risk 
 





Table 6.   ACQUAS Shipwreck Penetration-Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages 























4 DOF – X,Y,Z,Yaw  
Real-time data flow  
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The principal obstacles to overcome can be segregated into four primary 
categories: 1) vehicle size, shape and weight, 2) vehicle propulsion and control 
capability, 3) vehicle localization and mapping capability, 4) vehicle data 
collection, storage and processing capability, and 5) vehicle autonomous 
decision-making capability. 
1. Vehicle Size, Shape and Weight 
The typical AUV is too large to effectively maneuver inside the structure of 
a shipwreck. Of the AUVs considered, only U-CAT is small enough for easy 
maneuvering inside a typical structure. The size of the vehicle must be small 
enough to navigate narrow ship corridors and spaces, many of which will be 
degraded, and be easily manipulated and launched by humans in the 
constrained environment of a launching platform such as a submarine. It must 
also, however, be large enough to permit carrying sufficient sensors to conduct 
the mission. The vehicle’s weight, in and out of the water, is a significant factor 
as well. The vehicle should be as lightweight as possible out of water for ease of 
use by human operators and as lightweight as possible in water to conserve 
energy. Conservation of energy, in the form of reduced propulsion requirements, 
is necessary both to extend battery life and to limit the disturbance of visibility-
destroying fine sediment inside the shipwreck. Increased weight would lead to 
increased thrust requirements to alter the vehicle’s momentum resulting in 
greater disruption of water and silt.  
The shape of the vehicle is important for a number of reasons. Typical 
AUVs employ a generally square frame that provides easy equipment mounting, 
as is the case with the highly modular ACQUAS. DEPTHX is unique in employing 
an ellipsoid shape, beneficial for the implementation of its 3D-SLAM architecture. 
A generally smooth, ergonomic, aerodynamic shape would be beneficial to 
reduce snagging and drag. In summary, typical AUV architecture falls short of 
shipwreck-penetration capability because it is too big to fit inside a shipwreck 
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environment, too small to carry the necessary sensors for mapping and 
navigation, and is not smooth enough to prevent snagging. 
2. Vehicle Propulsion and Control Capability 
Of the vehicles considered, only U-CAT was designed specifically for 
shipwreck penetration missions; however, its four-fin propulsion system currently 
causes significant oscillations. Typical hovering-capable AUVs employ small 
thrusters for translation and attitude control, resulting in much smoother 
movements. This is generally acceptable in the open-ocean environment where 
the disruption of sediment—generally referred to as “silt-out” in the diving 
community—and entanglement in wires and other debris is of little concern. 
These environmental considerations are, however, extremely significant in the 
shipwreck environment. The vehicle must be capable of fine, steady, and precise 
movements to negotiate the hazards of the environment without silting it out. U-
CAT is also the only vehicle examined with a full six DOF. It is worth noting, 
however, that DEPTHX, HAUV and ACQUAS do not require all six DOF due to 
the flexibility of their sensor architecture. A full six DOF may not necessarily be 
required. In summary, current AUV architecture falls short of shipwreck-
penetration capability because either it presents too great a silt-out and 
entanglement hazard or it produces movements that are too rough for onboard 
sensors. 
3. Vehicle Localization and Mapping Capability 
Of the vehicles considered, DEPTHX, incorporating 3D-SLAM, presents 
an attractively-sophisticated localization and mapping method. Alternatively, the 
imaging sonar and DVL navigation solution employed by HAUV and ACQUAS is 
attractively simple. Each, unfortunately, fall short in the precision required for the 
acceptable mapping of shipwreck interiors – in the case of 3D-SLAM, due to the 
estimation errors of the sonar returns, and, in the case of DIDSON sonar 
imaging, due to the smoothing errors of complex areas. For the DEPTHX mission 
to the Zacaton cenote, the size and the relatively smooth nature of the cenote 
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walls did not require mapping precision to the degree that would be necessary to 
retrieve valuable intelligence from the interior of a submarine wreck. Similarly, the 
majority of the ship hull area typically searched by HAUV is simple, smooth and 
flat. The entirety of the submarine interior would be categorized as complex using 
the HAUV mapping algorithm, and, worse yet, no smooth surface will likely exist 
below these areas to allow for a DVL lock. Thus, this navigation and mapping 
methodology would currently allow for neither successful navigation nor mapping 
in the shipwreck interior environment. U-CAT, unfortunately, can neither navigate 
truly autonomously (homing beacons are necessary) nor generate useful maps 
(only a video camera is employed). It may simply be used as a means of 
recording images of the interior spaces as long as homing beacons are pre-
positioned along the hull or on an accompanying diver. In summary, current AUV 
architecture falls short of shipwreck-penetration capability because it employs a 
navigation methodology unsuitable for the environment, or it employs a mapping 
capability insufficiently precise for the environment.  
4. Vehicle Data Collection, Storage and Processing Capability 
The autonomous localization and mapping problem is computationally 
complex. A typical hovering AUV, such as HAUV or ACQUAS, employs a tether 
to transfer data in real-time to an operator, typically with access to greater 
computer processing power through the support station than the vehicle has 
itself. If the vehicle operates untethered, it will likely be more maneuverable, but it 
will require increased onboard data processing power, as is the case with 
DEPTHX. If the vehicle operates tethered, however, the onboard processing 
power requirement will be significantly reduced, the operator will have greater 
control (thereby reducing the risk of vehicle loss), and the operator will be able to 
collect real-time data without the need to recover the vehicle first (reducing 
mission-loss risk). Operations using tethers would, however, greatly limit the 
penetration capability of the vehicle without significant innovation. In summary, 
typical AUV architecture falls short of shipwreck-penetration capability because it 
fails to adequately incorporate either sufficient onboard processing capacity or an 
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adequate tether-management solution for the extreme environment of a 
shipwreck interior. 
5. Vehicle Autonomous Decision-Making Capability 
The capability of the vehicle to make decisions autonomously is critical to 
the successful exploitation of the shipwreck. As previously mentioned, DEPTHX 
has demonstrated its ability to autonomously decide when, where, and how to 
collect environmental specimens. DEPTHX, however, was designed to operate in 
spaces much less confined than a shipwreck interior, and some problems unique 
to the shipwreck environment must be overcome through autonomous decision-
making capability. The collection of physical targets is one example. To 
successfully collect a target, the vehicle must first identify a potential target and 
then determine whether or not to attempt to collect it, or mark it for future 
collection—perhaps by another vehicle in a system-of-systems architecture. 
Another example of a key decision-making task is the determination of how to 
overcome a physical obstacle. The four possible choices the vehicle may make 
when encountering an obstacle are: to go around the obstacle, to move the 
obstacle, to destroy the obstacle, or to abort the effort and decide on a new 
course. All of the vehicles previously examined are autonomous, capable of 
navigating independent of human control. None, however, were specifically 
designed with these unique wreck-interior exploration decision-making 
capabilities. In summary, typical AUV architecture falls short of shipwreck-
penetration capability because it lacks the ability to autonomously decide when 
and how to collect target objects and negotiate obstacles unique to the shipwreck 
interior environment. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION AND REQUIREMENTS 
GENERATION 
The generation of requirements and key performance parameters (KPPs) 
are an essential part of a system’s engineering approach toward an architectural 
solution that satisfies the primary objective.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with a functional decomposition of the high-level 
essential tasks (HLET) generated from the preliminary functional decomposition 
of the primary objective. Recall the primary objective from the DRM:  
The primary objective is to penetrate the submarine and collect 
intelligence, while mapping the interior spaces.  
From this primary objective, and the supporting system objectives, the KPPs will 
be generated. The functional decomposition, functional requirements, and non-
functional requirements will be mapped to the stakeholder effective needs. 
Similarly, the functional requirements will be mapped to the HLET. These 
relationships are depicted in Figure 27. 




















Through this systematic approach, a degree of thoroughness can be achieved 
even at the high-level architectural design phase. Additionally, the generation of 
mapping tables lessens the burden of traceability at later design stages, when 
the number of functions and requirements will be significantly greater. 
B. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
The following functional decomposition was derived from the elements of 
the HLET list created in Chapter II, in support of the primary objective. The 
purpose of this effort is to generate tasks that are as free from technological bias 
as possible. The high-level essential task list was created with the minimum 
possible technological direction in mind. Only the vehicle type (AUV) and the 
need for bathymetric mapping sensors hint at any specific technological solution. 
The HLETL analysis may be conceptualized as the first iteration of the following 
functional decomposition—the first “layer of the onion” in the iterative design 
process. The next iteration—a full, but general, functional decomposition—
leverages the increased understanding of the problem space and the existing 
technology while keeping the functions as general and free of technological bias 
as possible. The functional decomposition continues the development of all 
HLET tasks with the exception of the eighth task, the collection of targets of 
opportunity, which will be postponed for a future iteration. The resulting 
decomposition, therefore, assumes only the following hardware: the host 
submarine (HS), target submarine (TS), exploration vehicle (AUV), delivery 
vehicle (DV), and sensor array (including mapping, video recording and light 
producing hardware).  
1. Decomposition 
1. HS launches the AUV from depth 
1.1. HS locates TS 
1.2. HS stabilizes in proximity to TS for launch 
1.3. HS launches DV 
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2. DV delivers the AUV to the wreck interior  
2.1. DV executes search of sea floor for TS 
2.1.1. DV descends to the appropriate altitude above the sea floor 
 2.1.2. DV executes a search pattern 
 2.1.3. DV detects the TS  
2.2. DV conducts an external survey of TS 
 2.2.1. DV scans the hull exterior 
 2.2.2. DV identifies a potential hull breach 
2.3. DV deploys AUV 
 2.3.1. AUV undocks from DV 
 2.3.2. AUV propels itself away from DV 
2.4. AUV begins searching interior spaces 
 2.4.1. AUV commences the search pattern 
3. AUV maps and records the environment 
3.1. AUV enables its sensor array to scan the environment 
3.2. AUV sensors collect data necessary for 3D map generation  
3.3. AUV collects video data 
 3.4. AUV processes the sensor data to create a 3D map  
4. AUV systematically localizes  
 4.1. AUV records its location relative to known reference points 
 4.2. AUV maintains a current escape path plan 
5. AUV maneuvers within the wreck interior 
 5.1. AUV hovers in a stable position as required 
5.2. AUV translates in the horizontal plane as required 
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5.3. AUV translates in the vertical plane as required 
6. AUV moves between compartments 
 6.1. AUV determines the completeness of the current compartment map 
 6.2. AUV identifies compartment entrances 
 6.3. AUV records each location of new compartment entrance  
 6.4. AUV prioritizes each new compartment entrance  
 6.5. AUV returns to preferred entrance after completing current 
compartment 
 6.6. AUV passes through the new compartment entrance 
7. AUV overcomes obstacles 
7.1. AUV recognizes a physical obstacle 
7.2. AUV determines appropriate response to obstacle 
7.3. AUV executes response to obstacle 
7.4. AUV determines post-obstacle profile 
 7.4.1. AUV continues exploration if possible 
 7.4.2. AUV aborts exploration if necessary 
8. AUV decides when to return to DV 
 8.1. AUV returns to DV upon completing scan of all known compartments 
 8.2. AUV returns to DV when unable to continue compartment searches 
 8.3. AUV returns to DV upon reaching low-power threshold 
 8.4. AUV returns to DV upon suffering a critical casualty 
9. AUV returns to DV 
9.1. AUV returns to DV upon completing scan of all known compartments 
 9.2. AUV returns to DV when unable to continue compartment searches 
 9.3. AUV returns to DV upon reaching low-power threshold 
 9.4. AUV returns to DV upon suffering a critical casualty 
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10. DV returns to HS 
 10.1. DV returns to HS 
 10.2. DV docks with HS 
11. Crew retrieves AUV exploration data 
 11.1. Crew recovers DV with AUV 
  11.1.1. Crew sanitizes DV and AUV as necessary 
 11.2. Crew downloads exploration data from AUV 
2. Function Map to Effective Needs 
Table 7 maps the functions to the respective effective needs generated in 
the stakeholder analysis section. It is imperative that each function be associated 
with at least one specific need in order to prevent design creep.  
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Table 7.   Functions to Needs Map 
Function Need Function Need 
1 1.1, 2.1, 2.2. 7.1, 7.3 6.4 6.2, 7.1 
1.1 2.1 6.5 6.2, 7.1 
1.2 2.1, 2.2 6.6 7.1 
1.3 2.1 6.7.2 7.1 
2 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 6.7.3 7.1 
2.1 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 7 4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 
2.1.1 7.1 7.1 3.1, 6.2, 7.1 
2.1.2 7.1 7.2 6.2, 7.1 
2.1.3 7.1 7.3 6.2, 7.1 
2.2 3.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 7.4 6.2, 7.1 
2.2.1 3.1, 6.1, 6.2,  7.4.1 6.2, 7.1 
2.2.2 7.1 7.4.2 6.2, 7.1 
2.3 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 8 1.2, 5.1, 7.1 
2.3.1 7.1 8.1 7.1 
2.3.2 7.1 8.2 7.1 
2.4 1.3, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.2 8.3 7.1 
2.4.1 6.2, 7.1 8.4 7.1 
3 1.3, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2 9 1.2, 5.1, 7.1 
3.1 1.3, 6.1, 7.1 9.1 7.1 
3.2 1.3, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 9.2 7.1 
3.3 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1 9.3 7.1 
3.4 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 7.1 9.4 7.1 
4 6.2, 7.1 10 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 7.1 
4.1 6.2, 7.1 10.1 2.1, 7.1 
4.2 7.1 10.2 2.1, 2.2, 7.1 
5 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1 11 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1 
5.1 7.1 11.1 2.1, 2.2, 7.1 
5.2 7.1 11.1.1 2.2, 7.1 
5.3 7.1 11.2 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 7.1 
6 6.2, 7.1   
6.1 6.2, 7.1   
6.2 1.3, 6.2, 7.1   
6.3 6.2, 7.1   
 
C. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION 
System requirements may be defined as, “a description of how the system 
should behave, or an essential attribute of the system.” (NPS SE3100 Module 2, 
Slide 53, Spring 2014 Lecture). The objective of the requirements generation 
process is to establish guidance for design while reducing the ambiguity of the 
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effective needs. Requirements pertain to capabilities, functions, constraints, 
performance and effectiveness. Requirements should be specific, measurable, 
attainable, realistic and time-bound or traceable—commonly termed “SMART”—
and generally consist of an attribute or characteristic, a relationship and a value. 
The value may be binary—i.e., on or off, or capable or incapable, but it must 
measurable. Well-defined requirements reduce the risk of schedule slippage, 
cost overruns, technology bias and help to ensure that the design form follows 
the required function. The requirements for the system may be categorized as 
functional and non-functional. The specific numbers associated with each 
requirement in this thesis should be considered the author’s best guess for the 
design of a robust AUV solution to the DRM. The numbers in these requirements 
can be conveniently replaced in future work with values that reflect the product of 
actual stakeholder negotiations and the most current technological 
developments. Physical prototyping will also enable more refined values. The 
functional requirements, which are derived from the lowest-level functions 
(disregarding the parent functions) of the functional decomposition, are 
generated in the following section. 
1. Functional Requirements  
The strategy for the development of the functional requirements is to first 
consider, for each lowest-level function, what item the requirement pertains to, 
what the item is required to do, how soon it should begin doing it, how quickly it 
should execute the task, how accurately or precisely it should execute the task, 
or how well it should qualitatively execute the task. Once written, the requirement 
should be checked against the SMART guidelines. 
1) F1.3. HS launches DV 
FR1: DV shall be capable of launching from the HS at depths between sea level 
and 1,000 fsw. 
2) F2.1.1. DV descends to the appropriate altitude above the sea floor 
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FR2: DV shall begin descending from the HS to the search pattern depth within 5 
seconds of launch from the HS, at a rate of 5 ft. per second, slowing the descent 
as appropriate to enable stabilization at search pattern depth (+/-5 ft.), with no 
more than one overshoot, within ten seconds. 
3) F2.1.2. DV executes a search pattern 
FR3: DV shall begin the first leg of the pre-programmed search pattern upon 
stabilization at search pattern depth (+/-5 ft.) within 5 seconds. 
4) F2.1.3. DV detects the TS  
FR4: DV shall detect the TS during the search pattern, when the target is 
present, with a 99% probability of detection (Pd=.99). 
5) F2.2.1. DV scans the hull exterior 
FR5: DV shall descend to the scanning standoff distance of the TS within 5 
seconds of detection at search pattern depth, at a rate of 3 fps, slowing as 
necessary to stabilize within one foot of standoff distance to the TS hull with no 
overshoot and commence the scanning pattern of the TS hull within 2 seconds of 
stabilizing at standoff distance (+/-1 ft.).  
6) F2.2.2. DV identifies a potential hull breach 
FR6: DV shall detect a potential hull breach from the scanning standoff distance 
with a 95% probability of detection. 
7) F2.3.1. AUV undocks from DV 
FR7: DV shall release AUV into the TS interior within 5 seconds of undocking 
command. 
8) F2.3.2. AUV propels itself away from DV 
FR8: AUV shall propel itself clear of DV by at least 6 inches within 5 seconds of 
undocking command. 
9) F2.4.1. AUV commences the search pattern 
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FR9: AUV shall commence search pattern within 5 seconds of undocking 
command. 
10) F3.1. AUV enables its sensor array to scan the environment 
FR10: AUV shall be capable of complete coverage with its sensor array. 
11) F3.2. AUV sensors collect data necessary for 3D map generation 
FR11: AUV shall collect imaging data as necessary for 3D map generation. 
12) F3.3. AUV collects video data 
FR12: AUV shall collect high-definition (1080p) video data continuously during 
the mission. 
13) F3.4. AUV processes the sensor data to create a 3D map 
FR13: AUV shall process the sensor data as necessary to create a 3D map. 
14) F4.1. AUV records its location relative to known reference points 
FR14: AUV shall maintain a record of its location relative to known reference 
points throughout the mission. 
15) F4.2. AUV maintains a current escape path plan 
FR15: AUV shall maintain an updated escape path map throughout the mission. 
16) F5.1. AUV hovers in a stable position as required 
FR16: AUV shall be capable of attaining a hovering profile relative to an interior 
surface with less than 1 inch per second of forward/aft, lateral, or vertical drift, 
within 2 seconds of a hover command, in variable currents up to 5 fps with 
accelerations of 3 feet per second squared. 
17) F5.2. AUV translates in the horizontal plane as required 
FR17: AUV shall be capable of moving in any direction within the horizontal 
plane from a hover to a maximum in-water velocity of 5 fps in 2 seconds.  
18) F5.3. AUV translates in the vertical plane as required 
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FR18: AUV shall be capable of moving in any direction within the vertical plane 
and accelerate from a hover to a maximum ascent and descent rate of 1 fps in 2 
seconds. 
19) F6.1. AUV determines the completeness of the current compartment map 
FR19: AUV shall assess the completeness of the working map as the scan takes 
place and continue scanning the environment until complete (4π steradians) 
coverage has occurred.  
20) F6.2. AUV identifies compartment entrances 
FR20: AUV shall identify compartment entrances with a reliability of 95%. 
21) F6.3. AUV records each location of new compartment entrance 
FR21: AUV shall record the location of each new compartment entrance. 
22) F6.4. AUV prioritizes compartment entrances  
FR22: AUV shall prioritize compartment entrances for exploration in the following 
order: open, obstructed, closed. 
23) F6.5. AUV returns to preferred entrance after completing current 
compartment 
FR23: AUV shall begin maneuvering to the priority entrance of the new potential 
compartment, after completing the map of the current compartment, within 2 
seconds of completion.  
24) F6.6. AUV passes through the new compartment entrance 
FR24: AUV shall attempt compartment entrance passage when within 1 
horizontal foot of an open compartment entrance.  
25) F7.1. AUV recognizes a physical obstacle 
FR25: AUV shall identify a physical obstacle with a 99% probability of 
identification. 
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26) F7.2. AUV determines the appropriate response to the obstacle using a 
decision tree 
FR26: AUV shall determine the appropriate response (discontinue exploration of 
the space, bypass the obstacle, move the obstacle, or destroy the obstacle) to 
the obstacle with a reliability of 95%.  
27) F7.3. AUV executes response to obstacle 
FR27: AUV shall execute the response to the obstacle within 3 seconds of 
identifying the obstacle. 
28) F7.4.1. AUV continues exploration if possible 
FR28: AUV shall recommence compartment exploration within 2 seconds of 
bypassing the obstacle. 
29) F7.4.2. AUV aborts exploration if necessary 
FR29: AUV shall abort the exploration of the compartment upon exhausting 
obstacle circumvention options. 
30) F9.1. AUV returns to DV upon completing exploration of all known 
compartments 
FR30: AUV shall commence returning to the DV within 3 seconds of determining 
all available compartment search space has been explored. 
31) F9.2. AUV returns to DV when unable to continue compartment searches 
FR31: AUV shall commence returning to the DV within 3 seconds of determining 
its inability to continue further compartment searches. 
32) F9.3. AUV returns to DV upon reaching the low-power threshold 
FR32: AUV shall commence returning to the DV within 3 seconds of determining 
its estimated return power requirement is within the programed safety margin of 
the remaining power reserve. 
33) F9.4. AUV returns to DV upon suffering a critical casualty 
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FR33: AUV shall commence returning to the DV within 3 seconds of suffering a 
critical system casualty. 
34) F10. AUV docks with DV 
FR34: AUV shall dock with the DV with a reliability of 99%. 
35) F10.1. DV returns to HS 
FR35: DV shall begin ascending from the TS to the HS at a rate of 5 fps, slowing 
the ascent as appropriate to enable stabilization on docking profile (+/- 5 ft.) with 
no more than one overshoot, within ten seconds. 
36) F10.2. DV docks with HS 
FR36: DV shall initiate docking approach when within 20 horizontal feet of the DV 
recovery station, drive into the recovery station at a speed of 6 inches per second 
(+/- 2 inches per second) and within 5 degrees of the recovery profile. 
37) F11.1.1. Crew sanitizes DV and AUV as necessary 
FR37: DV and AUV shall be able to be sanitized for safe human exposure within 
10 minutes of recovery. 
38) F11.2. Crew downloads exploration data from AUV 
FR38: Exploration data shall be downloadable within 15 minutes of recovery. 
2. Functional Requirements Map to High-Level Essential Tasks 
Table 8 maps the functional requirements to the respective HLET items 
generated in the mission planning section of Chapter II. It is a useful tool for 
ensuring that each primary task is appropriately represented by its corresponding 
design requirements.  Note that only HLET 8, which will be addressed in future 
work, is missing from the map. 
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Table 8.   Functional Requirements to High-Level Essential Tasks Map 
FR HLET FR HLET FR HLET FR HLET 
1 1 11 3 21 4 31 9 
2 2 12 3 22 4 32 9 
3 2 13 4 23 6 33 9 
4 2 14 4 24 6 34 9 
5 2 15 4 25 7 35 9 
6 2 16 5 26 7 36 9 
7 2 17 5 27 7 37 9 
8 2 18 5 28 7 38 9 
9 2 19 4 29 7   
10 3 20 4 30 9   
 
3. Non-Functional Requirements 
The strategy for the development of the non-functional requirements is to 
consider the stakeholder needs, context, and other aspects of the problem space 
while applying the same techniques used to generate the functional requirements 
to encompass the necessary system attributes. A target submarine test 
environment (TASTE) is anticipated for future prototype testing and is periodically 
referred to in the following non-functional requirement list in order to enable the 
measurement of certain system attributes.  
Modularity  
NR1: AUV frame and subsystems shall be modular. 
Autonomy 
NR2: DV shall be capable of autonomously navigating to the programmed wreck 
site, searching for the TS, conducting the TS hull inspection, inserting and 
extracting the AUV, and returning the HS. 
NR3: AUV shall be capable of autonomously docking and undocking from the 
DV, navigating the TS interior and overcoming physical obstacles. 
Vulnerability 
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NR4: AUV shall be free of edges rough enough to cause snagging by filaments 
greater than 0.5 mm. in diameter. 
NR5: AUV shall be capable of translating through the TASTE without becoming 
entangled with 99% reliability. 
NR6: DV shall be capable of delivering the AUV to the TS in the TASTE without 
becoming entangled with 99% reliability. 
NR7: AUV shall be capable of translation through the TASTE without silt-out 
degradation in sensors with 85% reliability. 
NR8: AUV shall be capable of translation through the TASTE with no damage to 
the AUV structure with a reliability of 99%. 
NR9: DV and AUV shall be capable of withstanding 150% the maximum ambient 
operating pressure of the TS with no loss in functionality and no leaks with a 99% 
reliability. 
NR10: DV and AUV shall be capable of performing all mission tasks in water 
temperatures ranging between -5 to 140 degrees F. 
NR11: DV and AUV shall be capable of performing all mission tasks in the 
presence of toxic chemicals 150% higher in concentration than expected in the 
TS with 99% reliability. 
NR12: DV and AUV shall be capable of performing all mission tasks in the 
presence of radiation levels 150% higher than expected in the TS with 99% 
reliability. 
Reliability 
NR13: AUV shall be capable of performing all mission tasks in the TASTE with 
an intelligence-collection reliability of 95%. 
Availability 
NR14: AUV and supporting systems shall be capable of performing all mission 
tasks in the TASTE with an availability of 95%. 
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Maintainability 
NR15: AUV and supporting systems mean time between failures (MTBF) shall be 
greater than 100 hours. 
NR16: AUV and supporting systems shall be capable of being maintained by the 
crew in less than one hour. 
Testability 
NR17: AUV and support system operation shall be testable in the TASTE. 
Adaptability 
NR18: AUV and support system shall be capable of normal operations in the 
following alternate submerged environments: surface ships, passenger aircraft, 
building structures, and underwater caves. 
NR19: AUV and support systems shall be capable of a minimum of two hours 
operating time at the maximum translation speed. 
Affordability 
NR20: AUV and support systems production shall cost less than $5 million to 
production of the first vehicle. 
NR21: AUV and support systems subsequent to the first operational system shall 
cost less than $2 million. 
Compatibility 
NR22: AUV and support system shall be capable of normal storage and 
operations, including support system power, launch, recovery, and maintenance 
aboard U.S. Navy submarine and surface ship platforms. 
NR23: AUV and support system shall be capable of normal storage and 
operations, including support system power, launch, recovery, and maintenance 
aboard NATO submarine and surface ship platforms with a modification kit. 
Interoperability 
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NR24: DV shall be deployable and recoverable from the HS. 
NR25: AUV shall be deployable and recoverable from the DV. 
NR26: AUV and support system shall be serviceable and transportable via the 
HS. 
NR27: AUV and support system shall comply with HS hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) safety requirements. 
NR28: AUV and support system shall be storable within the designated HS 
storage space. 
Modifiability 
NR29: AUV and support systems shall be modifiable to operate from U.S. or 
NATO host vessels and to operate in the following alternate submerged 
environments: surface ships, passenger aircraft, building structures, and 
underwater caves. 
Portability 
NR30: AUV and support systems shall be portable, such that, within their storage 
cases, two men may move the entire system between assigned spaces on 
separate HS vessels on the same pier within an hour. 
NR31: AUV and support systems shall be capable of transportation on MH-60S 
(helicopter) and fixed-wing cargo aircraft, unpressurized to an altitude of 10,000 
ft. MSL.  
NR32: AUV and support systems shall be capable of transfer via vertical 
replenishment (VERTREP) at sea from an MH-60S. 
Recoverability 
NR33: AUV shall dock with the DV with 99% reliability. 
NR34: DV shall dock with the HS with 99% reliability. 
Reusability 
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NR35: AUV shall be capable of 100 missions before replacement with a reliability 
of 95%.  
NR36: DV shall be capable of 500 missions before replacement with a reliability 
of 95%.  
NR37: DV and AUV shall leave no discernable visual trace of exploration 
(signature). 
Usability 
NR38: Crewmember training for AUV and support system operation shall be less 
than six months. 
NR39: AUV and support systems shall be mission-capable with a two-man crew. 
4. Key Performance Parameters 
Key performance parameters (KPPs) are metrics for the most critical 
system performance goals. Identification of KPPs enhances the likelihood of 
synthesizing an architecture with maximum leverage for meeting the stakeholder 
needs. 
Key Performance Parameters 
1. The vehicle shall be sufficiently small to transit the TS interior, 
sufficiently smooth to resist snagging on debris, and sufficiently 
lightweight to be portable by two men. 
2. The vehicle shall be capable of autonomous propulsion, with 
sufficient agility and smoothness for complete environmental 
sensor coverage throughout the TS interior, without creating 
unacceptable silt-out conditions and while maintaining continuous 
awareness of the return route. 
3. The vehicle shall continuously map and record the TS interior with 
sufficient visual resolution and mapping precision to ensure useful 
intelligence collection. 
4. The vehicle shall be capable of sufficient processing capacity or 
tether-management to permit a complete mapping of the TS 
interior. 
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5. The vehicle shall be capable of deciding, autonomously, when and 
how to defeat an obstacle, collect a target of opportunity, or return 
to the HS. 
6. The system shall be interoperable with the host sub in all mission 
phases. 
7. The system shall be capable of preserving the secrecy of the 
mission. 
5. Functional and Non-Functional Requirements Map to Effective 
Needs 
Table 9 maps the functional and non-functional requirements to the 
respective stakeholder needs. It is a useful tool for ensuring that each effective 
need is met by at least one corresponding design requirement.  
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Table 9.   Functional and Non-Functional Requirements to Needs Map 
FR Need NR Need 
1 2.1 1 5.3, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 
2 7.1 2 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.2, 4.2, 7.2 
3 7.1 3 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.2, 4.2, 7.2 
4 7.1 4 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 
5 3.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 5 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 
6 7.1 6 2.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 
7 7.1 7 1.2, 5.2, 7.1, 7.4 
8 7.1 8 5.2, 7.1, 7.4 
9 6.2, 7.1 9 5.2, 7.2 
10 1.3, 6.1, 7.1 10 5.2, 7.2 
11 1.3, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 11 5.2, 7.2 
12 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1 12 5.2, 7.2 
13 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 7.1 13 1.3, 2.1, 5.1, 7.1 
14 6.2, 7.1 14 1.3, 2.1, 5.1, 7.1 
15 7.1 15 1.2, 2.2, 2.4, 5.2, 7.4 
16 7.1 16 1.2, 2.4, 5.2, 7.4 
17 7.1 17 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 7.2 
18 7.1 18 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.2, 7.4 
19 6.2, 7.1 19 2.1, 4.1, 7.2 
20 1.3, 6.2, 7.1 20 5.3, 7.5 
21 6.2, 7.1 21 5.3, 7.5 
22 6.2, 7.1 22 2.2 
23 6.2, 7.1 23 2.2, 7.3, 7.4 
24 7.1 24 2.2 
25 3.1, 6.2, 7.1 25 7.3 
26 6.2, 7.1 26 2.2 
27 6.2, 7.1 27 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 
28 6.2, 7.1 28 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 7.4 
29 6.2, 7.1 29 2.2, 7.3, 7.4 
30 1.2, 7.1 30 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 7.4 
31 1.2, 7.1 31 2.2, 2.5, 7.4 
32 1.2, 7.1 32 2.2, 2.5, 7.4 
33 1.2, 7.1 33 7.1, 7.2 
34 1.2, 7.1 34 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 7.1 
35 1.2, 2.2, 5.1, 7.1 35 1.2, 5.2, 5.3, 7.4 
36 2.1, 2.2, 7.1 36 1.2, 5.2, 5.3, 7.4 
37 2.6 37 1.1, 7.4 
38 1.3, 2.1, 5.1, 7.1 38 2.4, 2.5, 5.3, 7.4 
  39 2.4, 2.5, 5.3, 7.4 
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V. ARCHITECTURE SYNTHESIS 
In this chapter, the general functions and requirements of the previous 
chapter will be combined with the knowledge generated from the literature review 
and the capability gaps in order to arrive at one possible architectural solution to 
the problem of shipwreck interior exploration.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The architecting process begins with an examination of some key design 
tradeoffs. With this knowledge, a physical and functional architecture is then 
developed. An assessment of potential future versions brings the chapter to a 
close.  
B. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN TRADEOFF CONSIDERATIONS 
Before the synthesis of an architectural solution can begin, some key 
design tradeoff considerations must be discussed. Many architecture decisions 
will be made throughout the iterative design process, but some have such a 
significant impact on the design of the vehicle that they should be carefully 
considered as early as possible. In this section, five such tradeoffs will be 
considered.  
1. Tethered versus Untethered Operations 
The use of a tether has significant advantages and disadvantages and 
greatly impacts the physical and functional architecture of any AUV. In the 
confines of a wreck, the use of a tether has the advantage of allowing some key 
decisions to be made by a human operator instead of the autonomous logic of 
the vehicle’s software. A tether may provide electrical power to the vehicle, thus 
reducing the necessary battery storage within the vehicle and allowing more 
internal space to be allocated to sensors, flight control, computer hardware and 
other subsystems. The tether may also serve as a means for finding the way out 
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of the shipwreck. Clearly, the advantages of tethered operations compel serious 
consideration. 
 The principal disadvantage of tethered operations, however, particularly in 
the shipwreck environment, is the entanglement hazard. If the tether is dragged 
through the wreck, it is likely to become entangled or damaged by the wreck 
structure. A loss of the tether could mean the loss of the vehicle itself, as is the 
case with ROVs, and this is one major reason why ROV operators rarely risk 
venturing inside shipwrecks. Although the risk of entanglement or damage to the 
tether could be reduced if the tether was dispensable from the vehicle itself, the 
increased weight and complexity of carrying an onboard tether spool would likely 
limit the performance of the vehicle. Should the vehicle be designed to drag the 
line through the wreck interior spaces, the weight of such a line would likely 
require increased translation power from the vehicle, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of sediment disruption in addition to the reduction in maneuverability. 
No matter how flexible and resilient such a line may be, a limit inevitably exists to 
the number of turns the vehicle could make through a wreck interior before the 
line snags, is damaged, or requires too much force to overcome the resistance. 
Additionally, should the tether become damaged and break or require jettison, 
leaving it behind could provide a signature that would be harmful to the secrecy 
of the mission. 
2. Vehicle Size 
The size of the vehicle is, in the case of this DRM, naturally constrained by 
the environment in which it must explore. Since the interior spaces of a ship or 
submarine are generally compact, the use of a large vehicle such as DEPTHX is 
obviously excluded. The average human, for whom most vessel compartments 
were designed, may still need to squeeze through various spaces—especially on 
a submarine—even in its original, un-sunk condition. The vehicle should, 
therefore, be generally smaller than a human. It is easy to imagine a small AUV 
propelling itself through the interior passages of a wreck. It is hard to imagine, 
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however, anything much larger than a basketball fitting through passageways 
and hatches, particularly when those passageways are partially obstructed. Much 
smaller vehicles, perhaps the size of a baseball, may be less likely to become 
entangled, but would also be incapable of carrying most useful sensors. The 
basketball and baseball, then, may be considered the rough maximum and 
minimum potential vehicle sizes given the current state of sensor technology. 
The tradeoff is straightforward—too big and the vehicle will be less capable of 
freely traveling inside the wreck, too small and the vehicle will be less capable of 
performing the required sensory functions.  
3. Vehicle Shape 
The vehicle’s shape is a significant architectural decision. The vehicle’s 
shape is important for multiple reasons, including its resistance to entanglement, 
the use of its internal space, the employment of its sensors, its modularity and 
the ease of its design and manufacture. A square or rectangular vehicle, such as 
HAUV and ACQUAS, enhance modularity and simplify control. A spherical or 
ellipsoid vehicle, such as DEPTHX, reduces the snagging potential on the wreck 
interior structure and enables the use of circularly mounted scanning sensors. 
Spherical and ellipsoid designs are, however, more difficult to manufacture and 
require an efficient use of internal space. 
4. Propulsion Method 
Multiple methods for propulsion exist. The use of propellers (or thrusters) 
is perhaps the most common. Propellers present the advantages of efficiency, 
simplicity, and controllability. Many options for propellers exist on the market. The 
thrust produced is generally predictable. Additionally, the vehicle motion is 
potentially very smooth under propeller propulsion. The principal disadvantage, 
particularly for wreck interiors, however, is the propeller’s propensity for fouling 
on debris or becoming damaged by contact with objects. Techniques may be 
implemented, such as shielding the thrusters or burying them within tunnels, to 
help alleviate this problem. Another disadvantage is the harsh propeller wash 
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produced during operation, which may easily stir up sediment. A fin-propelled 
vehicle, such as U-CAT, has the advantage of minimizing silt-out conditions and 
fouling on debris. The primary disadvantage, however, is the difficulty with which 
steady motion is achieved.  
5. LIDAR vs. Sonar 
The shipwreck interior environment necessitates the use of aquatic 
mapping tools with great precision. Since the objects and passages within a 
shipwreck interior are generally small and highly complex compared to traditional 
objects for underwater mapping, such as ship hull exteriors, the sea floor, or 
cavern walls, the use of imaging tools capable of producing very high-resolution 
maps is necessary for effective wreck interior mapping and localization. Sonar 
has historically been the choice for bathymetric mapping. Sound beams expand 
rapidly compared to laser energy, however, and the resulting large sonar beam 
footprint translates into less densely populated point clouds (2G Robotics 2015a). 
Objects or details smaller than the corresponding footprint cannot be resolved. It 
is possible, however, to trade longer-range capability for higher-resolution 
capability. Light detection and ranging (LIDAR) is a newer technology with 
significantly increased resolution at ranges under five meters (2G Robotics 
2015a). This significant range limitation is due to the rapid attenuation of light in 
water. LIDAR, therefore, is often incapable of fulfilling the needs of those seeking 
long-range underwater mapping technology. The shipwreck interior, with most 
scanning needs well under five meters, is ideally suited for laser scanning. The 
narrow beam produces multiple orders of magnitude greater resolution than 
sonar, resulting in far denser point clouds (2G Robotics 2015a). A sample LIDAR 
image of a spool with a flange, taken by 2D Robotics using a ULS-500 laser 





Figure 28.  Sample Laser Scanning Image 
 
Source: 2G Robotics. 2015. “Spool Metrology with 2G Robotics ULS-500.” 
Accessed Dec. 11. http://www.2grobotics.com/spool-metrology-with-2g-robotics-
uls-500/. 
Unlike sonar, laser scanners are not adversely affected by false echoes in 
confined spaces. Laser scanners are, however, adversely affected by suspended 
particulate matter, since these particles scatter light. Nevertheless, software 
methods for silt filtering enable high-quality imagery even in the presence of 
some silt. The ULS-100, the smallest of three laser scanners produced by 2G 
Robotics, is an example of a potentially useful laser scanner for a wreck interior 
exploration AUV. The ULS-100 scanner is shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.  G Robotics ULS-100 Laser Scanner 
 
Source: 2G Robotics. 2015. “ULS-100 Product.” Accessed Dec. 11. http://www. 
2grobotics.com/products/underwater-laser-scanner-uls-100/. 
This scanner has a maximum range of 1 m. with a 50-degree laser scan 
angle (2G Robotics 2015b). The scanner’s range resolution is 0.30 mm. at 1 m., 
with a maximum sample rate of 2400 points per second. Figure 30 shows the 
ULS-100 in the process of scanning an offshore bracing jacket along with the 
resulting image. 
Figure 30.  ULS-100 Scanning Image 
 
Adapted from: 2G Robotics. 2015. “ULS-100 Results.” Accessed Dec. 11. 
http://www.2grobotics.com/products/underwater-laser-scanner-uls-100/. 
C. WRECK INTERIOR EXPLORATION VEHICLE (WIEVLE) 
In this section, an architecture design is presented. The solution is a 
system-of-systems approach that incorporates a modified version of the REMUS 
AUV, as the delivery vehicle for a spherical AUV, called the Wreck Interior 
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Exploration Vehicle (WIEVLE), which autonomously explores and maps the 
interior spaces of the target shipwreck. The WIEVLE architecture incorporates 
many of the best features of the vehicles discussed in the literature review, 
modified for the DRM of Chapter II. Specifically, WIEVLE incorporates the basic 
shape, autonomous mapping capability, and low snag features of DEPTHX. 
DEPTHX also inspired the concept of sensor arcs to eliminate the need for 
excess maneuvering to position sensors. WIEVLE incorporates some features 
shared by HAUV, U-CAT, and ACQUAS as well, including the capability to be 
launched from confined spaces, with or without the use of a delivery vehicle. 
WIEVLE incorporates some of the aspects of modularity of ACQUAS and the 
small size (approximately the size of a volleyball), reduced silt-disturbing 
propulsion and buoyancy control pistons of U-CAT. The vehicle architecture 
addresses the need for a small, lightweight, low-snag vehicle with silt-out 
resistant propulsion, autonomous localization and mapping capability for confined 
environments, data collection, and autonomous decision making, as identified in 
the capability gaps section of Chapter III. The software development aspects of 
the vehicle are not discussed, with the exception of a rudimentary logic map for 
interior mapping, localization, and entrance prioritization. Hardware aspects, 
however, are explored in greater detail. 
1. Physical Architecture Elements 
PA1: REMUS DV kit 
The DV kit attaches to the front of REMUS and consists of two primary 
subcomponents: the WIEVLE cage and the laser rangefinder array. The REMUS 





Figure 31.  REMUS AUV Delivery Vehicle 
 
 
The laser rangefinder array consists of a narrow, cylindrical band of 
rangefinders oriented outward from the REMUS central axis, giving the beams a 
wagon-spoke-like appearance, as shown in Figure 32.  
Figure 32.  Laser Rangefinder Array 
 
These rangefinders are used to determine when REMUS has sufficiently 
penetrated the breach in the TS hull to safely deploy WIEVLE. Since WIEVLE is 
Sidescan Sonar 
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located forward of the rangefinder array, when a sufficient number of sectored 
beams intercept a nearby surface, the DV nose is properly positioned within the 
interior, and the DV may safely release WIEVLE (see Figure 43).  
The WIEVLE cage is mounted forward of the rangefinder array on the DV 
kit. WIEVLE is carried from the HS to the TS within this expandable cage, as 
shown in Figure 33.  
Figure 33.  WIEVLE Cage 
 
 
In the closed position, WIEVLE is secured within the cage with minimal 
snagging risk. In the expanded position, WIEVLE is allowed to jettison upon 
insertion into the TS hull. The cage remains in the expanded position at the end 
of the mission, as WIEVLE returns to REMUS, to aid the docking process. When 
WIEVLE is in position, the cage contracts to secure WIEVLE for transport back to 
the HS. A homing navigational beacon, called the origin beacon, is located at the 
center rear of the basket and provides the final waypoint for WIEVLE’s return at 















PA2: WIEVLE sensor sleeves 
The sensors are mounted flush with WIEVLE’s outer shell within movable 
sleeves in order to preserve the smoothness of the exterior surface. The sensor 
array includes two high-definition (HD) cameras for visual environmental 
recording with corresponding LEDs for illumination, and two LIDAR scanning 
sensors, as shown in Figure 34. The LEDs should be oriented such that the 
beams do not intersect near the camera lens in order to prevent unwanted 
illumination, known as “bloom-out,” of particulate matter close to the lens. 
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Figure 35.  WIEVLE Exterior—Top and Bottom View 
 
 
Three sleeves, two longitudinal arcs (polar sleeves) and one equatorial 
circle (equatorial sleeve), enable the four sensor sectors to rotate. The polar 
sleeves rotate about the geometric center in the vertical plane while the 
equatorial sleeve rotates up to 180 degrees about the geometric center in the 















Figure 36.  WIEVLE Sensor Sleeve Freedom of Movement 
 
The sensor sleeves rotate on tracks via small electric motors in order to 
position the sensors during the scanning process. The sleeve’s freedom of 
movement (FOM) is limited to prevent interfering with the tunnel thruster and 
buoyancy compensator tubes and ports at the bottom of the vehicle. The sensor 
sleeves lock and unlock the plates in which the sensors are mounted as 
necessary to allow the plates to be handed off from the equatorial sleeve to a 
polar sleeve, or vice versa, as necessary. Due to the relatively large field of view 
of the sensors (50 degrees for the ULS 100 LIDAR), a nearly complete scan of 
the environment can be achieved. The uncovered regions, two cones oriented 
along the vertical axis on the top and bottom of the vehicle, will be covered as the 
vehicle translates in any horizontal direction from the hovering position. A 
principal benefit of the use of rotating sleeves is the elimination of a great deal of 
maneuvering necessary for sensor coverage, and consequently, less disruption 
of silt. 
Polar sleeve FOM Equatorial sleeve FOM 
Top View Side View 
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 Internally, the vehicle’s modular components are positioned symmetrically 
in order to ensure a distribution of weight that maintains a center of gravity 
slightly lower than the geometric center, with equal off-axis weight distribution. 
The distribution of internal components illustrated in Figure 37.  
Figure 37.  WIEVLE Internal Architecture 
 
An equipment shelf, located below the geometric center, remains fixed to 
the vertical tubes, which house the thrusters, buoyancy compensator pistons, 
and beacons. The equipment shelf is an attachment point for battery storage, 
computer space and the motors, which drive the buoyancy compensator (BC) 
pistons. Note the clearance from the shelf to the sensor arrays necessary to 
allow for the sleeve’s FOM. The functions of the thrusters, buoyancy 
compensators and beacon cylinder shown in the figure will be discussed in 





















PA3: WIEVLE flight control system 
WIEVLE uses four angled tunnel thrusters to provide propulsion. The 
tunnel thrusters are located symmetrically about a central vertical shaft that 
contains the deployable network beacons. Internal thrusters minimize the risk of 
fouling the propellers on debris. The upward oriented water jets reduce silt-out 
conditions. Since sediment mostly collects on the floor of the structure, orienting 
the jets upward avoids the jet path impacting a majority of the silt. This technique 
is similar to a technical scuba diver’s frog kick cycle, as shown in Figure 38.  
Figure 38.  Technical Diver Executing Proper Form 
 
Adapted from: Unified Team Diving. 2015. “UT Side Mount Diving.” Accessed 
Dec. 5. http://unifiedteamdiving.ning.com/group/utdsidemountdiving. 
When a diver executes a frog kick, the knees are bent and the fins rotated 






diver forward, while the corresponding fin wash is directed upward and aft of the 
diver, away from the floor sediments. WIEVLE’s tunnel thrusters draw water 
through the four lower inlets. The inlets are guarded with screens to prevent 
ingesting propeller-fouling debris such as string or wire, and may be cleared of 
debris if necessary with a momentary reversal of thrust direction (see Figure 35). 
The flow path of water through the vehicle’s internal structure is shown in Figure 
39.  
Figure 39.  Water Flow Through WIEVLE Tunnel Thrusters 
 
 
Note the four tunnel thrusters, labeled 1–4, and the buoyancy chambers, 
labeled B1–B4. In a stationary hover, the four thrusters produce equal thrust, as 
necessary to offset the vehicle’s buoyancy, while producing no net horizontal 
thrust. The vehicle’s buoyancy is controllable by changing the volume of four 
airtight pistons located within the buoyancy chambers. To increase the buoyancy 
of a chamber, the compressed air cylinder piston expands downward, displacing 
the water out of the tunnel and replacing it with the expanding air. The 
Front&View& Top&View&
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corresponding volume increase generates the buoyant force. Likewise, the piston 
retracts and compresses the air to decrease the buoyancy. The pistons may act 
collectively or individually to compensate for thrust as necessary. The center of 
gravity is located below the geometric center, and the center of buoyancy is 
located above the geometric center to maintain a self-righting attitude. The free 
body diagram for the hovering state is shown in Figure 40. 
Figure 40.  Free Body Diagram for WIEVLE in Hovering Mode 
 
Note the thrust forces associated with each tunnel thruster, labeled T1–T4, 
act at the point of flow direction change, near the geometric center. The weight, 
W, acts at the center of gravity, and the net buoyancy, B, acts at the center of 
buoyancy. With the tunnel thrusters providing equal and sufficient force to offset 
the buoyancy, the vehicle hovers in static equilibrium. To move forward, the 
thrust from any two thrusters can be increased to produce a net horizontal 
Front&View& Top&View&
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component of thrust that allows the vehicle to be propelled in any direction within 
the horizontal plane. The free body diagram for the forward flight state is shown 
in Figure 41.  
Figure 41.  Free Body Diagram for WIEVLE in Forward Flight 
 
 
Note the additional thrust component vectors, T1+ and T2+, which produce 
a net positive horizontal thrust (to the right) allowing translation. To move forward 
without sinking, the vehicle’s buoyancy is increased to offset the increase in the 
net vertical thrust that results from increasing the output of tunnel thrusters 1 and 
2. The buoyancy chamber opposite thrusters 1 and 2 is activated for this task. 
The net buoyant force is increased sufficiently to prevent the vehicle from 
sinking. The clockwise moment about the center of gravity caused by the 
increased thrust is counteracted with a counterclockwise moment caused by the 
increased buoyancy from B3. Adjustment of either total vehicle buoyancy or net 
vertical thrust allows the vehicle to translate in the vertical plane and regulate 
buoyancy throughout the mission, as the network beacons are dropped.  
Front&View& Top&View&
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PA4: WIEVLE deployable network beacons 
WIEVLE houses multiple navigational beacons within a sealed pressure 
cylinder along the vehicle’s vertical axis. These individually identifiable beacons 
are deployed to establish the navigation network. The low profile, camouflaged 
beacons are disk-shaped and stack tightly within the cylinder to eliminate wasted 
space.  
Figure 42.  Deployable Beacon 
 
The beacon cylinder contains a spring and a water port at the top. The 
spring maintains downward pressure on the watertight plunger, which presses 
down on the beacon stack to ensure a reliable feed at the bottom of the vehicle. 
The water port allows a small volume of water to enter the cylinder above the 
plunger, after each beacon deployment, to replace most of the weight lost and 
reduce the need for internal buoyancy compensation. As shown in Figure 42, the 
disks contain two small holes on opposite sides of the central axis. Two 
corresponding rods, secured at the top of the vehicle near the spring and water 
port, extend through these holes, preventing the disks from rotating. The disks 





edges are threaded, allowing them to be screwed into a threaded sleeve, which 
fits snugly inside the beacon cylinder. The threaded sleeve is rotated inside the 
beacon cylinder by an actuator motor when a beacon dispense command is 
received from the onboard computer, and the lowest beacon is screwed out at 
the bottom of the tube. A thin metallic wafer separates each beacon to shield the 
lowest disk from the ambient water.  
The disks are slightly heavier than water and sink upon release. As the 
beacon sinks, a small cone-shaped chute is pushed upward by initial water flow 
and acts as a drag chute to keep the disk vertically oriented (see Figure 42). The 
water activates the beacon by completing an electrical circuit, similar to a 
standard dive watch. Water-soluble epoxy secures six spring-needle legs in 
place along the top of the beacon during storage in the cylinder. When released, 
the epoxy quickly dissolves and the legs swing down into the landing position. 
The needle-sharp legs allow the beacon to land on various surfaces, which may 
be slanted or covered with a layer of silt or slime, and resist sliding or tumbling 
after contacting the surface, thus preserving the integrity of the map.  
2. Functional Architecture Elements 
FA1: REMUS AUV DV is launched from the HS 
A submerged Virginia-class submarine launches a REMUS AUV (the 
delivery vehicle) from its dry dock. 
FA2: REMUS searches for the TS 
REMUS descends to the search pattern depth (approximately 20–30 m.) 
and commences its search of the sea floor for the target submarine using its side 
scan profiling sonar. This dual frequency (900 kHz and 1800 kHz) sonar 
propagates from each side of the vehicle in a fan with an average range of 
approximately 80 m. (see Figure 31). 
FA3: REMUS conducts a TS hull survey 
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Upon locating the target, REMUS transitions its flight path and begins 
conducting an external hull survey, looking for a breach in the hull, using its 
micro-bathymetry profiling sonar—a high-resolution, 2250 kHz sonar with a 10 m. 
maximum range—and, upon locating a potential breach, a dual-axis imaging 
sonar for even higher resolution. 
FA4: REMUS deploys WIEVLE into the TS interior 
Upon discovering a suitable breach, REMUS hovers nose-forward into the 
hole, stabilizing itself relative to the hull. Using its laser rangefinder array, 
REMUS determines that it has sufficiently penetrated the TS hull to safely deploy 
WIEVLE. Figure 43 depicts the delivery of WIEVLE to the TS hull breach. 
Figure 43.  REMUS Inserts WIEVLE Through Target Submarine Hull 
 
When these conditions are met, REMUS releases WIEVLE by opening the 
cage, and WIEVLE propels itself away from REMUS with a thrust burst. Figure 




Figure 44.  REMUS Deploys WIEVLE Into the Target Submarine Interior 
 
Upon undocking, the origin beacon is activated in REMUS, which 
continues to hover in place at the entrance.  
FA5: WIEVLE commences TS interior exploration 
WIEVLE begins executing the interior exploration by scanning and 
translating through the interior. As the vehicle travels, it scans and records the 
wreck interior by systematically rotating the sensor sleeves.  
FA6: WIEVLE localizes while building the 3D map  
As WIEVLE begins its exploration, it initially records and monitors its 
relative vector to the origin beacon on REMUS. This beacon becomes the origin 
of the 3D map it will create by laying its beacon network, as well as the exit point 
of the escape path it will maintain throughout the mission. Upon translating the 
necessary distance interval, it releases the first deployable network beacon, 
which sinks to the floor. The beacons are deposited throughout the interior to 





WIEVLE assigns an identifier for each beacon released at nominal 
distance intervals or specific events, such as the turning of a corner in the 3D 
flight path. The vehicle maps the interior using its LIDAR without the need for 
SLAM since geo-rectification of the map may be attained with the numbered 
beacons. Thus, the beacon disks both aid in the creation of the map and become 
a sort of “bread crumb trail” leading back to REMUS.  
FA7: WIEVLE executes a complete, systematic search of the TS interior 
WIEVLE assesses the map completion status of each compartment within 
the TS. The vehicle continues the scan until the compartment is fully mapped 
while simultaneously looking for an entrance to another compartment or a 
potential hatch to breach. Open, obstructed and closed entrances are noted on 
the map and prioritized in that order, with open entrances assigned priority over 
closed or obstructed entrances. The identification of an entrance, such as a 
hatch, window or door, is a target recognition problem that will not be addressed 
in this work. Upon completion of the mapping of a compartment, the vehicle 
continues the exploration by moving to the priority entrance or returning to the 
DV. In Figure 45, a four-compartment generic shipwreck space is represented. 
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Figure 45.  WIEVLE Beacon Network 
 
 
Each compartment has either an open, closed, or partially obstructed 
hatch. The vehicle begins the exploration in compartment 1 at the top of the 
figure. Each beacon release point is annotated on the diagram with a numbered 
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“x.” Each beacon is also labeled with a letter corresponding to the logic for the 
beacon release. “A” represents beacons released at the beginning of a new 
compartment search. “B” represents beacons released after translating a nominal 
distance along the wreck interior. “C” represents beacons released after turns 
greater than a nominal number of degrees. “D” represents beacons released to 
mark the location of an entrance. The large, circled numbers represent the 
following major events: 
1. WIEVLE begins exploring compartment 1. 
2. An unobstructed entrance is noted. 
3. Compartment 1 scan is complete and WIEVLE decides to move to 
the priority entrance (at beacon 7). 
4. WIEVLE begins exploring compartment 2. 
5. A closed hatch entrance is noted. 
6. An obstructed hatch entrance is noted. 
7. Compartment 2 scan is complete and WIEVLE decides to move to 
the priority entrance (at beacon 16).  
8. WIEVLE begins exploring compartment 4. 
9. Compartment 4 scan is complete, no further exploration is possible 
(due to the closed hatch of compartment 3), thus, WIEVLE decides 
to end the mission and return to the DV. The updated escape path 
at Event 9 (beacon 25) is 16 – 20 – 7 – 2 – 1.   
FA8: WIEVLE overcomes obstacles when necessary. 
To overcome an obstacle, the vehicle must maneuver around it, move it, 
or destroy it. Maneuvering around the obstacle is the preferred method. To 
maneuver around the obstacle, the vehicle must first sense the obstacle and a 
potential path around the obstacle. The vehicle then alters course to navigate 
around the obstacle or through the gap. If the vehicle determines the obstacle 
cannot be avoided, but a suitable space exists beyond the obstacle, then it must 
decide to attempt to move the obstacle, destroy the obstacle, or abort the effort. 
If the vehicle aborts the effort, it may continue exploring another reprioritized 
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compartment or return to REMUS. If WIEVLE decides to move the object, it may 
attempt to push past it. The smooth design of the vehicle is helpful in this effort, 
yet the blunt nature of a sphere and the limited power of non-horizontally 
configured thrusters hinders this effort. One potential option for reducing the risk 
of damage to the sensors as the vehicle pushes past movable obstacles, such as 
dangling wires or insulation, is to rotate the sensors out of direct contact with the 
obstruction during the push through.  
3. WIEVLE Architecture Map to General Functional Requirements 
The physical architecture elements (PAEs) and functional architecture 
elements (FAEs) are mapped to the corresponding general functional 
requirements of the previous chapter in Table 10.  
Table 10.   Architecture Map to Functional Requirements 
PAE Requirements FAE Requirements 
1 7, 34 1 1 
2 9, 10, 11, 12 2 2, 3, 4 
3 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 30, 31, 32, 33 3 5, 6 
4 13, 14, 15, 21, 23, 30 4 7, 8 
  5 9 
  6 11, 13, 14 
  7 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 24 
  8 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 
 
4. Future Versions 
The WIEVLE architecture, as described in this chapter, encompasses one 
possible solution to most of the essential tasks identified for wreck interior 
exploration. Many changes will inevitably take place in future iterations 
throughout the preliminary design, detail design, and prototype testing phases. 
Looking forward, one may speculate options for future versions of the system. 
The ability to overcome challenging obstacles and collect targets of opportunity 
are two such potential versions. 
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 The ability to overcome obstacles is satisfied in a very limited manner by 
the first version of the vehicle (WIEVLE 1.0). As mentioned in the functional 
architecture discussion, the vehicle’s only course of action, given an autonomous 
decision to move (or move through) an obstacle is to push it in an attempt to slide 
past. No capability to destroy the obstacle exists. The drawbacks of this 
technique were also mentioned. In version 2.0, the vehicle might incorporate 
gripper arms to assist in the moving of light objects such as wires, monofilament 
and other relatively benign obstacles. Perhaps the arms could take the form of an 
arc that extend from the equatorial sensor sleeve, or coiled from within the 
vehicle. A simple gripper could be replaced or assisted by a cutting tool, perhaps 
in the form of sheers or a rotary cutting bit. Heavier obstacles, such as fallen 
pipes or closed metal hatches, present a much more formidable problem. The 
delivery of explosives to the obstacle, though possible, would likely silt-out the 
wreck and possibly destroy or entrap the vehicle. The use of thermal cutting 
devices might overcome some of these obstacles. Dragging gas lines through 
the wreck is unlikely to be successful, but non-gas underwater cutting methods, 
such as the use of a thermite pyrotechnic cutting tool, present a possibility. A 
flexible thermite rope may be fixed around an object in order to destroy or cut 
through it by heat without sending a silt-disturbing shock wave throughout the 
wreck. 
 Another consideration for a version 2.0 WIEVLE is the ability to retrieve 
targets of opportunity. If the vehicle’s capacity for thrust and collective buoyancy 
were high enough, the vehicle may have the ability to lift small objects from areas 
within the wreck and bring them back. Besides the necessary lifting force and 
propulsive power, the vehicle would need sufficient controllability while loaded to 
maneuver along the escape path and back to the DV. Even if the vehicle returns 
with the object, however, the trip back to the HS through potentially high currents 
while carrying the load may prove either impossible or a recovery hazard for the 
HS. Perhaps WIEVLE’s strongest contribution to the physical object collection 
effort would be to mark the location of a target of opportunity on the map and 
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collect sufficiently high-resolution video and mapping data to provide a positive 
identification for a future collection effort with another vehicle.  
 The use of other vehicles, in combination with WIEVLE, as part of a 
system-of-systems, is a potentially optimal approach for problems of such 
complexity as the full exploration and exploitation of an underwater shipwreck. 
Specialized vehicles, perhaps cooperating with one another, are, in the author’s 
opinion, much more likely to be successful in the hostile and technologically 
challenging environment of shipwreck interiors. Adding “bells and whistles” to any 
vehicle design until it becomes a Swiss army knife will more likely result in the 








The objective of this thesis was to develop, using a systems engineering 
approach, a functional analysis, general requirements, key performance 
parameters, and high-level architectural tradeoff considerations leading to an 
architecture synthesis for an AUV capable of shipwreck interior exploration.  
A. SUMMARY 
Throughout this thesis, the research questions posed in the introductory 
chapter were addressed. In Chapter I, the first primary research question set the 
stage for the design reference mission: What type of challenging AUV mission 
might be of interest to the Department of the Navy? The exploration of shipwreck 
interiors by an AUV was presented as a challenging and important potential 
mission for a number of key stakeholders, including the Department of the Navy. 
The absence of an existing solution for this mission was described. A brief 
synopsis of the history of shipwreck exploration, the specific importance of 
shipwreck interior exploration, a background on UUVs and a discussion of AUVs 
set the stage for an enhanced understanding of the DRM of Chapter II.  
The DRM described, in specific detail, the Soviet nuclear submarine 
Komsomolets, the background of her sinking, important characteristics of her 
construction and the environment in which she rests. A hypothetical reference 
mission was then offered, detailing a specific objective and describing potential 
intelligence collection targets. Following the DRM, the second primary research 
question was asked: What high-level alternatives exist for such a mission? Four 
high-level alternatives were then discussed in detail. The benefits and drawbacks 
of traditional human shipwreck penetration, human shipwreck penetration using 
atmospheric suits, ROV shipwreck penetration, and the covert raising of the 
submarine itself were all established. Following this, the decision to proceed with 
an AUV system solution to the mission was justified and the preliminary mission 
planning was begun. After laying out the key assumptions, the next important 
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research question was raised: What are the high-level essential tasks for the 
mission laid out in the DRM? The resulting nine tasks became the bedrock for 
the remaining research effort. The principal constraints were then discussed, 
outlining first the expected operating conditions during the submarine loading and 
transport phase, the submarine launch phase, the target exploration phase, and 
the recovery phase. Logistic considerations and time constraints were followed 
by a detailed assessment of expected environmental threats to the mission and 
the vehicle itself, to include entanglement, silt-out, strong and unpredictable 
currents, abrasion puncture and shock damage, temperature and pressure 
variations, toxic substances, corrosion, failure to collect the required data and 
compromising the secrecy of the mission due to signature at the target site.  
In Chapter III, the problem space was developed, beginning with the 
answer to the fourth research question: What are some of the potential 
stakeholder’s effective needs? The resulting needs analysis began by identifying 
the stakeholders and carefully considering the value each could receive from an 
AUV solution to the problem. The needs were refined into effective needs 
statements for each stakeholder. The chapter concluded with the answer to the 
next research question: What would the scope of such a mission look like? The 
purpose of the effort, division of future life cycle responsibilities among systems 
engineering, program management, and Defense Department personnel, and 
operational context—culminating in the creation of an operational concept 
graphic, context diagram and definitions, followed. Within the discussion of 
project scope, the next research question was answered: What are the relevant 
concerns and objectives? The identification of principal concerns began with a 
list of the characteristics of a perfect vehicle and a discussion of the key 
concerns of an actual AUV solution. The system objectives were then discussed, 
with a mention of the system capabilities outside the scope of the effort of this 
thesis.  
The literature review, contained in the second half of Chapter III, provided 
detailed discussion of the architecture of some of the most relevant existing AUV 
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systems. The vehicle descriptions and methodologies for DEPTHX, HAUV, 
ARROWS (including U-CAT) and ACQUAS provided the answer to the critical 
research question: What are the characteristics of the architecture and 
methodology employed by existing AUVs for the exploration and mapping of 
other unexplored three-dimensional environments? Following this analysis, the 
advantages and disadvantages, with respect to wreck interior exploration, of 
each vehicle’s architecture were generated in four tables. The analysis that 
followed answered the critical research question: What are the corresponding 
capability gaps? Five primary gaps were identified: 1) vehicle size, shape and 
weight, 2) vehicle propulsion and control capability, 3) vehicle localization and 
mapping capability, 4) vehicle data collection, storage and processing capability, 
and 5) vehicle autonomous decision-making capability. 
Chapter IV detailed the general functional analysis and requirements 
generation that answers the research question: What are the functions and 
requirements of an effective AUV solution? The resulting functional 
decomposition resulted in 11 primary functions, with sub-functions up to two 
levels down decomposed from these. In keeping with standard systems 
engineering discipline, the functions were then mapped back to the effective 
needs. A requirements analysis then followed, resulting in the generation of 38 
general requirements, which were then mapped to the high-level essential tasks. 
Non-functional requirements were then explored, examining the system attributes 
of modularity, autonomy, vulnerability, reliability, availability, maintainability, 
testability, adaptability, affordability, compatibility, interoperability, modifiability, 
portability, recoverability, reusability, and usability. This resulted in the generation 
of 39 non-functional requirements. All requirements were then mapped back to 
the original stakeholder needs, and seven key performance parameters were 
established.  
Chapter V harvested the effort sown in the first four chapters by 
synthesizing one possible architectural solution to the DRM. The chapter began 
with an examination of five key architectural tradeoff considerations, thus 
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answering the final research question: What key tradeoffs should be considered 
in the architecture synthesis? After discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of tethered and untethered vehicles, vehicle size, vehicle shape, 
propulsion method, and the use of LIDAR and sonar, a wreck interior exploration 
vehicle (WIEVLE) architecture was developed. The physical architecture 
elements were described first, followed by the functional architecture elements. 
The architectural elements were then mapped to the general functional 
requirements of Chapter IV. The chapter concluded with recommendations for 
possible future versions of the vehicle.  
B. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ARCHITECTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Based on the analysis of existing systems and the problem space, the 
author recommends that future architectures include the following characteristics: 
• small outer dimensions (approximately the size of a basketball)  
• smooth, preferably round, solid outer surfaces with flush-mounted 
sensors 
• minimum weight 
• tunnel thrusters, or guarded propellers 
• maximum sensor freedom of motion and field of view 
• minimal required maneuvering for sensor positioning 
• robust, reliable and precise mapping and localization capability 
• robust and conservative autonomous decision making capability 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In addition to the future versions of WIEVLE discussed at the end of the 
previous chapter, much work remains in the development of autonomous 
underwater vehicles for exploring shipwreck interiors. Continuing with the 
development of WIEVLE is one possible avenue. A preliminary design, leading to 
a prototype, would undoubtedly bring significant change to the physical and 
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functional architectures in future iterations. Another avenue is the development of 
other, supporting AUVs, which might aid a vehicle like WIEVLE in the exploration 
effort as a part of a system-of-systems. Yet another fascinating area for future 
research leaves the realm of AUVs entirely—the development of a low-profile, 
highly-capable atmospheric suit, enabling human shipwreck penetration under 
atmospheric conditions. Perhaps the attractiveness of such a solution owes 
largely to man’s inherent desire to go to extreme environments and see the 
mysteries first hand. Each of these avenues, if pursued in earnest, could 
potentially yield a trove of new and valuable discoveries.   
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